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3 
THE NEW PARADIGM OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE U.S. 
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT “PATTERN OR PRACTICE” SUITS IN 
CONTEXT 
SAMUEL WALKER* 
I.  AMERICAN POLICING TODAY: THE BEST OF TIMES/THE WORST OF TIMES 
In April 2001, the city of Cincinnati experienced a riot reminiscent of the 
1960s: an outburst of African American rage following the fifteenth fatal 
shooting of a young black man by the Cincinnati Police Department in six 
years.1  At the same time, the department was sued by local civil rights and 
civil liberties groups over racial profiling. The police crisis led to an 
investigation of the police department by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. 
Justice Department. In the spring of 2002, the racial profiling suit and the 
Justice Department investigation were jointly settled through a Memorandum 
of Agreement with the Justice Department and a Collaborative Agreement with 
the plaintiffs in the racial profiling suit.2 
The two Cincinnati agreements mandate a series of reforms designed to 
enhance police accountability. The Memorandum of Agreement requires, 
among other changes, a revision of the police department’s policy on the use of 
force, the development of policies governing deployment of the canine unit, a 
risk management system to identify “problem” officers, and a court appointed 
 
* Isaacson Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE 68182-
0149; samwalker@unomaha.edu.  In the interest of disclosure, the author has been directly 
involved in some of the activities and reports cited in this article.  He was a paid consultant to the 
Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice in its investigation of the New Jersey 
State Police and the Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, D.C. He also participated in 
conferences and discussions that led to the Justice Department report, PRINCIPLES FOR 
PROMOTING POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY.  See PRINCIPLES, infra note 18. 
 1. See Francis X. Clines, Appeals for Peace in Ohio After Two Days of Protests, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2001, at A18. 
 2. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE AND THE CITY OF CINCINNATI, OHIO AND THE CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT (April 
12, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/Cincmoafinal.htm [hereinafter CINCINNATI 
MEMORANDUM]; Collaborative Agreement, In re Cincinnati Policing, No. C-1-99-3170, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15928, at *27 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2002), http://www.cincinnatipolice.org/doj/ 
finalsettlement.pdf, also available at http://enquirer.com/editions/2002/04/04/ 
loc_text_of_collaborative.html. 
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monitor to oversee implementation of the Agreement.3  The Collaborative 
Agreement mandates the Cincinnati Police Department to implement 
Community Problem Oriented Policing, the City to consolidate the two 
existing citizen complaint agencies into a single agency, and for both the City 
and the police department to create an evaluation program including both 
surveys of citizens and observations of police work.4 
Similar reforms are also contained in the consent decrees and memoranda 
of understanding secured by the Justice Department to settle investigations of 
police misconduct in other cities. The Justice Department is acting under 
authority of 42 U.S.C § 14141, which authorizes the Attorney General to bring 
civil suits against police departments where there is a “pattern or practice” of 
violations of citizens’ rights.5  To date, there have been a total of eight such 
settlements, with the most highly publicized ones involving the Pittsburgh 
Police Bureau,6 the New Jersey State Police,7 the Los Angeles Police 
Department,8 and the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of 
 
 3. CINCINNATI MEMORANDUM, supra note 2. 
 4. In re Cincinnati Policing, supra note 2, at *19-20. 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2002). 
§ 14141. Cause of action. 
(a) Unlawful conduct. 
  It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any 
person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of 
conduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any governmental 
agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of 
juveniles that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States. 
(b) Civil action by Attorney General. 
  Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of 
paragraph (1) has occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name of the United States, 
may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the 
pattern or practice. 
Id. 
 6. See Consent Decree, United States v. Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. approved Apr. 
16, 1997) [hereinafter Pittsburgh Decree], http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/pittssa.htm. 
 7. See Joint Application for Entry of Consent Decree, United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-
5970 (D. N.J. approved Dec. 30, 1999) [hereinafter N.J. Decree], http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm; see also PETER VERNIERO & PAUL H. ZOUBEK, INTERIM 
REPORT REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING (1999), http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ 
intm_419.pdf. 
 8. Consent Decree, United States v. Los Angeles, No. 00-11769 (C.D. Cal. approved June 
15, 2001) [hereinafter L.A. Decree], http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/laconsent.htm; see 
also BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE RAMPART AREA CORRUPTION INCIDENT, LOS ANGELES 
POLICE DEPARTMENT, PUBLIC REPORT (2000), www.lapdonline.org/pdf_files/pc/boi_pub.pdf; 
RAMPART INDEP. REVIEW PANEL, REPORT OF THE RAMPART INDEP. REVIEW PANEL (2000), 
http://www.ci.la.ca.us/oig/rirprpt.pdf. 
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Columbia.9  At the same time, similar settlements have been reached in suits 
by the Attorney General of California against the City of Riverside,10 the 
Attorney General of New York against the Town of Wallkill,11 and a private 
suit by the NAACP and the ACLU against the Philadelphia Police 
Department.12 
The police problems in Cincinnati, Los Angeles, New Jersey, and other 
locales might well lead a reasonable person—that is, someone well-informed 
about civic events but with no special expertise in policing—to conclude that 
the American police have made little if any progress since the strife-torn 
decade of the 1960s.13  Racism, brutality, and corruption might appear to be as 
prevalent and serious today as they were then.  This might also suggest that the 
various police reforms of the last thirty years have been for naught.  These 
reforms include Supreme Court limits on police practices,14 community 
policing and problem-oriented policing,15 a significant increase in the number 
of African-American, Hispanic and female police officers,16 and dramatic 
improvements in police officer educational levels and training programs.17 
Our hypothetical reasonable person, however, would be misled by the 
events that have dominated the news.  Quietly, and with little publicity, a 
number of police departments have made significant progress with regard to 
police accountability in recent years and have taken steps to curb excessive 
force, unjustified shootings, and other forms of misconduct.  The best 
 
 9. See MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN 
POLICE DEPARTMENT (June 13, 2001) [hereinafter D.C. MEMORANDUM], http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
crt/split/documents/dcmoa.htm. 
 10. Stipulation for Entry of Judgment, California v. City of Riverside (Cal. Super. Ct., 
Riverside County, Att’y Gen. Draft of Feb. 12, 2001) (on file with author). 
 11. First Report of the Monitor, New York v. Town of Wallkill, No. 01-CIV-0364 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 2002) (on file with author). 
 12. NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1996) (on file with 
author). 
 13. See generally NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).  This commission is also 
known as the Kerner Commission. 
 14. See THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW JUSTICE, AND POLICING (Richard A. Leo and George 
C. Thomas eds., 1998). 
 15. See generally Jack R. Greene, Community Policing in America: Changing the Nature, 
Structure, and Function of the Police, in POLICIES, PROCESSES, AND DECISIONS OF THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 299 (J. Horney ed., 2000); MICHAEL S. SCOTT, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST 20 YEARS (2000). 
 16. SAMUEL WALKER & CHARLES M. KATZ, THE POLICE IN AMERICA (4th ed. 2002). 
 17. See DAVID L. CARTER ET AL., THE STATE OF POLICE EDUCATION: POLICY DIRECTION 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 73 (1989); see also WALKER & KATZ, supra note 16, at 387, 431-38 
(reviewing trends in policing). 
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indicators of this development are, ironically, the consent decrees and 
memoranda of understanding secured by the Justice Department under § 
14141. The specific reforms mandated in those agreements were not developed 
by the Justice Department itself but were drawn from recognized “best 
practices” related to accountability already in place in other more progressive 
police departments.18  In effect, the consent decrees have ratified and given the 
Justice Department’s sanction to a new consensus regarding reforms designed 
to promote police accountability. 
The purpose of this article is to place the Justice Department’s consent 
decrees and memoranda of understanding under § 14141 in a broader context 
of police reform efforts.19 Taken as a whole, these reforms represent a new 
paradigm of police accountability, which includes not just a specific set of 
“best practices” but also an overarching conceptual framework of 
accountability. With reference to the most important provisions of the consent 
decrees and memoranda of understanding related to Pittsburgh, the New Jersey 
State Police, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and Cincinnati, this article 
assesses the nature and significance of the new paradigm of accountability. 
II.  ELEMENTS OF THE NEW PARADIGM 
The new paradigm of police accountability consists of five elements. 
A. A Short List of Best Practices 
The first element is an emerging consensus of opinion on a short list of 
best practices designed to enhance accountability. These best practices include: 
(a) a comprehensive use-of-force reporting system,20 (b) an open and 
accessible citizen complaint system,21 (c) an early intervention (or warning) 
 
 18. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING POLICE INTEGRITY 3 (2001), 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/ojp/186189.pdf [hereinafter PRINCIPLES], which presents the best 
summary of these best practices.  This report was developed through a series of Justice 
Department sponsored conferences as workshops in the preceding years.  See also U. S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CONFERENCE: STRENGTHENING POLICE-COMMUNITY 
RELATIONSHIPS, SUMMARY REPORT (June 1999) (on file with author) [herinafter ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S CONFERENCE]. 
 19. For a preliminary assessment following the first two § 14141 cases, see Debra 
Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 815, 844 (1999). 
 20. See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, USE OF FORCE BY POLICE: OVERVIEW 
OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL DATA 21-22 (1999) (discussing use-of-force policies and presenting 
data). 
 21. See generally SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN 
OVERSIGHT 5-7 (2001) (discussing various methods of citizen complaint procedures). 
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system to identify potential “problem” officers,22 and (d) the collection of data 
on traffic stops for the purpose of curbing racial profiling.23  The best summary 
statement of these best practices is the January 2001 Justice Department report, 
Principles for Promoting Police Integrity, issued in the last days of the Clinton 
Administration.24  In various ways, these best practices are incorporated into 
all of the consent decrees and memoranda of understanding currently in 
force.25 
B. Conceptual Framework 
Second, the new paradigm involves an overarching conceptual framework 
for the best practices cited above. The new framework emphasizes changing 
police organizations, as opposed to pursuing individual officers guilty of 
misconduct, for the purpose of cultivating an organizational culture that will 
sustain professional conduct in the future.26  In an initial assessment of the 
Justice Department’s efforts under § 14141, Debra Livingston argues that the 
“conclusion drawn by many police scholars” is that  “police reform will be 
most effective  . . . when reform involves not simply adherence to rules in the 
fact of punitive sanctions, but a change in the organizational values and 
systems to which both managers and line officers adhere.”27  Section 14141 
specifically authorizes the Justice Department to bring suit against police 
organizations rather than individual officers.28  As this article argues, one of 
the limits of many previous police reforms is that they have been narrowly 
directed toward particular organizational problems or to punishing individual 
officers guilty of misconduct. These efforts have not achieved lasting 
 
 22. See generally Samuel Walker, et al., Early Warning Systems for Police: Responding to 
the Problem Police Officer, RESEARCH IN BRIEF (U.S. Dep’t of Justice/Nat’l Inst. Of Justice, 
Washington D.C.), July 2001 [hereinafter Early Warning], http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/ 
188565.pdf; SAMUEL WALKER, EARLY INTERVENTION SYSTEMS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES: A PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT GUIDE (2002) (unpublished report submitted to the 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter EARLY INTERVENTION]. 
 23. See generally DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING 
CANNOT WORK 175-77 (2002) [hereinafter PROFILES]; DAVID A. HARRIS, ACLU, DRIVING 
WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION’S HIGHWAYS (June 1999), 
http://archive.aclu.org/profiling/report/index.html [hereinafter DRIVING WHILE BLACK]. 
 24. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18. 
 25. Provisions of the various consent decrees are referenced below in the context of 
discussions of particular issues. 
 26. This point is argued in WALKER, supra note 21, at 109. 
 27. Livingston, supra note 19, at 848. 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2002).  See supra note 5 in which the statutory text is presented. 
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improvements, in large part, because dysfunctional organizational cultures 
limit or undermine reforms or condone misconduct by other officers.29 
C. Collection and Analysis of Systematic Data 
Third, the operational strategy of the new paradigm involves the collection 
and analysis of systematic data on officer performance for the purpose of 
identifying recurring problems that merit corrective action. This strategy 
closely parallels developments in policing, medicine,30 private enterprise, and 
other government agencies,31 which focus on the collection and analysis of 
systematic agency performance. One of the most celebrated recent reforms in 
policing, COMPSTAT, involves the collection and analysis of systematic data 
on crime patterns for the purpose of focusing crime reduction efforts.32  The 
reform strategy is illustrated by a comment from Merrick Bobb, Special 
Counsel to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD), in a report on one 
troubled unit in the LASD. He concludes by observing: “[T]his chapter began 
with a discussion about numbers and ended with a discussion about 
management. This is how it should be.”33  The reform strategy of the new 
paradigm, instead of focusing on individual officers, uses comprehensive data 
about agency and officer performance to identify management problems that 
are likely to lead to misconduct by individual officers. 
D. Convergence of Internal and External Strategies 
Fourth, the new paradigm represents the convergence of two strategies for 
accountability that have historically been seen as competing alternatives.34  
 
 29. “The [LAPD’s] Board of Inquiry report fails to recognize that the central problem is the 
culture of the Los Angeles Police Department, which gave rise to and tolerated what occurred in 
the Rampart Division and elsewhere.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, AN INDEP. ANALYSIS OF THE LOS 
ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT’S BOARD OF INQUIRY REPORT ON THE RAMPART SCANDAL 
(2000), reprinted in 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 549, 551 (2001).  See also RAMPART INDEP. REVIEW 
PANEL, supra note 8, at 2. 
 30. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN 77-78 (1999). 
 31. For example, consider Baltimore’s CitiStat program, described at 
http://www.ci.baltimore.md.us/news/citistat/index.html, as a data collection and analysis tool 
useful for all city agencies. 
 32. See David Weisburd, Steven D. Mastrofski, A. M. McNally, R. Greenspan, J. J. Willis, 
Reforming to Preserve: Compstat and Strategic Problem Solving in American Policing (2002) 
(unpublished article prepared for the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nat’l Inst. of Justice, under review 
with CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY, and on file with author); see also JACK MAPLE, THE 
CRIME FIGHTER 33 (1999). 
 33. MERRICK J. BOBB ET AL., LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T, 15TH SEMIANNUAL 
REP. 9-35 (2002) [hereinafter 15TH SEMIANNUAL], http://lacounty.info/mbobb15.pdf, also 
available at http://www.co.la.ca.us/bobbreports/mbobb15.pdf 
 34. See text at Part IV infra. 
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Traditionally, the police vigorously insisted that they have both the 
responsibility and the capacity to manage their own affairs—including matters 
of discipline—free of external intervention. Civil rights activists, despairing of 
the capacity of police departments to police themselves, have pursued a variety 
of external mechanisms of accountability.35  These mechanisms have included 
the intervention of the courts, particularly with respect to constitutional 
standards for police work, and external citizen oversight agencies to handle 
citizen complaints. A bitter struggle between the claims of professional 
autonomy and external oversight defines much of the politics of policing over 
the previous four decades. In this struggle, internal and external mechanisms of 
accountability have been seen as competing and irreconcilable alternatives. 
This article argues, to the contrary, that in the new paradigm internal and 
external mechanisms merge to form a mutually reinforcing, “mixed” structure 
of accountability.36 
E. Building on Past Reforms 
Fifth, the new paradigm builds upon past police reforms, taking into 
account both their shortcomings and accomplishments. The result is a more 
sophisticated awareness of the conditions necessary for achieving genuine 
accountability in policing. In brief, these requirements are threefold: that to be 
effective any reform must (a) reach deep into the police organization; (b) have 
some direct impact on the day-to-day behavior of police officers; and (c) 
ultimately change, or at least begin to change, the culture of police 
organizations.37  The new paradigm of accountability takes these conditions 
into account and represents a significant advance over prior reform efforts. 
III.  POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY DEFINED 
Police accountability consists of several different dimensions.38  In a 
democratic society the police should be answerable to the public for both what 
 
 35. Walker, supra note 21, at 24. 
 36. OFFICE OF INDEP. REVIEW, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, FIRST REPORT (2002), 
http://www.laoir.com/report1.pdf; ELLEN GREEN-CEISLER, INTEGRITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, ENFORCEMENT OF NARCOTICS LAWS (2002), 
http://inquirer.philly.com/specials/2002/narcotics/report.htm. 
 37. See Chemerinsky, supra note 29, at 4; WILLAM A. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE 
POLICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF LAW, CUSTOM, AND MORALITY (1970) (the classic work on 
the norms of secrecy in the police subculture). 
 38. The literature on American policing is disturbingly scant on the subject of accountability.  
This summary of the dimensions of accountability is taken from THE INDEP. COMM’N ON 
POLICING IN N. IR., A NEW BEGINNING: POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND 22 (1999), 
http://www.belfast.org.uk/report/fullreport.pdf.  A fuller discussion will appear in NAT’L 
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they do—law enforcement, order maintenance, and the provision of 
miscellaneous public services—and how they conduct themselves. This article 
focuses exclusively on issues related to what has been called the integrity or 
legitimacy of the police in their treatment of individual citizens and 
demographic groups.39  In brief, the police are expected to treat citizens in a 
lawful, respectful, and equal manner. The tragic history of American policing 
involves a long history of physical brutality, corruption, violations of 
constitutional rights, and race discrimination.40  As the next section of this 
article argues, previous reform efforts have not adequately curbed these 
abuses.  This article does not address accountability issues related to the crime-
fighting effectiveness or the efficiency of police operations, although both are 
matters for which the police should be held accountable.41 
One of the central dilemmas of policing in a democratic society is that the 
demands of the public and the law often conflict. The political process is the 
basic means of ensuring that the police reflect the will of the people.  Mayors, 
city council members, county commissioners, governors, state legislatures, 
presidents, and the Congress exercise control and oversight through budgets 
and appointments.42  At the same time, the police are also accountable to the 
law and should conform to established standards of legality in all of their 
operations (including not just law enforcement activities such as arrests and 
searches and seizures, but also personnel procedures involving equal 
employment opportunity, sexual harassment, and so on).  The courts are the 
principal mechanism for this aspect of accountability. The history of American 
criminal justice is replete with episodes where public demands conflict with 
legal standards. In policing this usually involves the majority demanding the 
police do things that are illegal, as in overly aggressive law enforcement tactics 
that violate the rights of individuals or entire classes of persons.43  In a classic 
 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE EVIDENCE ON POLICING: FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN U.S. 
LAW ENFORCEMENT (forthcoming 2002). 
 39. The term “legitimacy” is increasingly used to encompass the related issues of police 
compliance with the law and citizen perceptions of the police. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
SCIENCES, supra note 38. 
 40. See generally SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM, THE 
EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1977); ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE (1977). 
 41. Geoffrey P. Alpert & Mark H. Moore, Measuring Police Performance in the New 
Paradigm, in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 109 (1993). 
 42. See WALKER & KATZ, supra note 16, at 351-56. 
 43. This is the central theme in SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2nd ed. 1998).  See also JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT 
TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (3rd ed. 1994). 
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statement of the problem, Herbert Packer defined it in terms of a clash between 
crime control and due process perspectives on the criminal process.44 
The political dilemma involving conflicting demands on the police 
translates into policy dilemmas regarding alternative mechanisms for 
enhancing police accountability. This has generally taken the form of tensions 
between internal mechanisms, in the form of professional management and 
supervision, and external mechanisms, in the form of direct political control, 
the courts, and external review agencies.45  Part IV of this article reviews the 
contributions and shortcomings of the various internal and external 
accountability mechanisms in order to establish the context for the new 
paradigm. 
IV.  TRADITIONAL POLICE REFORMS: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND LIMITATIONS 
The modern police reform movement is just over one hundred years old.46  
Traditional strategies for achieving police accountability may be divided into 
three categories that roughly parallel the three branches of American 
government: administrative, judicial, and legislative. 
A. The Administrative Strategy: Professional Police Management 
1. The Police Professionalism Movement 
The principal internal mechanism of police accountability is embodied in 
the administrative strategy of professional police management. The 
professionalization movement emerged in the early years of the twentieth 
century.47 The reform agenda of the professionalism movement included 
expert leadership, freedom from external (especially political) influence, the 
application of the principles of modern management to police organizations, 
and elevation of personnel standards, both through higher minimum 
recruitment standards and better training.48  The classic statements of 
professional police management are found in the reports and text books by, 
first, August Vollmer,49 and later his disciple, O. W. Wilson. Wilson’s text, 
 
 44. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149 (1968). 
 45. See discussion infra Part IV.A-D. 
 46. WALKER, supra note 40. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON POLICE: 
POLICE CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1931).  August Vollmer served as the principal 
author of the report, which summarized ideas he had developed in previous reports on local police 
departments.  This commission is also known as the Wickersham Commission. 
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Police Administration, served as the virtual “bible” for police chiefs from the 
1950s through the 1970s.50 
The core principle of police professionalism is that law enforcement 
agencies have both a responsibility and a right to manage their own affairs, just 
as other professions enjoy a high degree of autonomy and control over their 
domains.51  To this end, generations of police managers have strenuously 
fought the actual or threatened intrusions into their managerial prerogatives, 
whether by the U.S. Supreme Court, citizen oversight agencies, or police 
unions.52 
The professionalism movement achieved many improvements in American 
policing. Most police departments were far better managed in the 1960s than 
they were in 1900.53  Personnel standards, as indicated by minimum entry 
requirements and formal pre-service training programs, were far higher 
(although this author has argued that at that time there were, for all practical 
purposes, no “standards” in the modern sense at all).54  Most police 
departments assigned more patrol officers to high crime areas, and made other 
efforts to allocate personnel on a rational basis. Police chiefs’ obsession with 
adding more patrol cars and acquiring sophisticated communications 
technology reflected a sincere effort to provide better service by responding as 
quickly as possible to all citizen calls for service.55  Compared with the utter 
lack of professionalism that prevailed through the late nineteenth century, 
 
 50. O. W. WILSON AND R. C. MCLAREN, POLICE ADMINISTRATION (4th ed. 1977). 
 51. See the provocative discussion of the development of a police monopoly over their 
professional mandate in PETER K. MANNING, POLICE WORK: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF 
POLICING (1977). A critique of this insular professional monopoly over the delivery of public 
services is one of the core principles of the community policing movement. George L. Kelling 
and Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing, PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING, Nov. 1988, 
at 1, 10-14. 
 52. For a contemporary account of the fierce reaction to the Supreme Court, see FRED P. 
GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970). On the reaction to police unions, see generally 
PETER FEUILLE, POLICE UNIONISM (1973). On citizen oversight, see WALKER, supra note 21. See 
the various contributions in the valuable collection, POLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA: CRISIS 
AND OPPORTUNITY (William A. Geller ed., 1985). 
 53. It is possible to benchmark improvements in policing by comparing the data on police in: 
Leonard P. Ayres, The Cleveland Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice, Address 
Before the City Club of Cleveland (Feb. 18, 1922), in THE CLEVELAND SURVEY OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1922, at 4-9 (the first of the modern crime 
commissions); NATIONAL COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON 
CRIMINAL STATISTICS (1931) (the first national crime commission); THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N 
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE (1967). 
 54. WALKER, supra note 40. 
 55. WALKER, supra note 43, at 165-167. 
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when police departments were the “adjuncts” of political machines, the 
achievements of the professionalism movement were substantial.56 
2. The Shortcomings of Professionalism 
In the 1960s the American police were engulfed in a national crisis that 
exposed serious problems and called into question both the achievements and 
the assumptions of the professional management approach. The crisis was 
provoked by two developments: the intervention of the U.S. Supreme Court 
into police operations and the civil rights movement. 
In a series of landmark cases, the U.S. Supreme Court intervened into 
previously unregulated aspects of routine police procedures, notably searches 
and seizures and in-custody interrogations, and imposed new constitutional 
standards for police conduct.57  From the standpoint of accountability, the 
significant aspect of the Court’s activism is that it exposed the extent to which 
police managers had failed to govern effectively the exercise of police 
authority. In a disturbing commentary on traditional police professionalism, the 
Kerner Commission noted that “many of the serious disturbances took place in 
cities whose police departments are among the best led, best organized, best 
trained, and most professional in the country.”58  In the Los Angeles Police 
Department, for example, professionalism involved an aggressive crime-
fighting style that included such tactics as frequent stops and frisks that 
aggravated community relations.  The Court’s intervention not only forced 
departments to revise their policies and procedures to conform to new 
constitutional standards but, in the process, also stimulated a larger process of 
reform.59 
At the same time, the civil rights movement challenged abuses of police 
power, particularly the use of both deadly and physical force, discriminatory 
enforcement of the laws, and race discrimination in employment.60  Virtually 
all of the urban riots of the 1964-1968 period were sparked by an incident 
involving the police.61  The police officer in the ghetto became the symbol of 
the national crisis in race relations. The principal demands of civil rights 
 
 56. The characterization of the police as “adjuncts to the machine” is in ROBERT FOGELSON, 
BIG-CITY POLICE 13 (1977). 
 57. For a discussion of these cases see Samuel Walker, Historical Roots of the Legal Control 
of Police Behavior, in POLICE INNOVATION AND CONTROL OF THE POLICE (David Weisburd and 
Craig Uchida eds., 1993). 
 58. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 13, at 301. 
 59. Walker, supra note 57, at 32. 
 60. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST 241-292 (1969). WALKER, supra note 
40, at 124-25. 
 61. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 13, at 68. 
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leaders became the hiring of more African-American officers and the creation 
of civilian review boards to handle citizen complaints.62 
An examination of O.W. Wilson’s Police Administration text dramatizes 
what the professional management strategy failed to do with respect to 
accountability. Even the fourth edition published in 1977 contains no reference 
to police discretion and devotes a total of four pages (out of more than 600) to 
supervision through “written directives,” or what is today recognized as 
administrative rulemaking.63  Moreover, the discussion is couched in generic 
terms and makes no specific reference to the use of deadly force, physical 
force, high-speed pursuits, or other critical uses of police power. There is no 
acknowledgment of the pervasive exercise of discretion, nor recognition of the 
extent to which discretion can be abused and result in violations of individual 
citizens’ rights, including unequal enforcement of the law and the use of 
excessive physical force and unjustified deadly force. 
The principal failure of traditional professional police management was 
that it represented organizational formalism. It assumed that accountability 
would be achieved by means of a correctly designed organizational structure 
with clear lines of authority and reporting, together with the rational allocation 
of personnel according to workload. Missing from this approach was any 
explicit discussion of what police officers actually do on the street (the subject 
that has been at the core of sociological studies of policing since the late 
1950s),64 the situations they routinely encounter, the fact that they exercise 
broad discretion in choosing among alternative responses, and that without 
specific guidance they might make bad decisions that could violate citizens’ 
rights.65  Wilson’s administrative formalism, in short, assumed that the 
arrangement he recommended would reach down into the organization and 
shape officer behavior, but in fact it failed to do so. 
3. Administrative Rulemaking 
Detailed rules designed to control officer behavior began to emerge in the 
1960s through the technique of administrative rulemaking. The basic tool of 
police management today, the departmental standard operating procedure 
manual, is typically a large loose-leaf notebook consolidating all current rules 
and regulations. Administrative rulemaking also lies at the core of the new 
paradigm of police accountability.66  The history of the development of 
 
 62. WALKER, supra note 43, at 180-183, 193-201. 
 63. WILSON AND MCLAREN, supra note 50, at 136-141. 
 64. Samuel Walker, Origins of the Contemporary Criminal Justice Paradigm: The American 
Bar Foundation Survey, 1953-1969, 9 JUST.Q. 47, 50 (1992). 
 65. NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 38. 
 66. See text at Part V infra. 
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administrative rulemaking in policing is extremely complex and uneven. Police 
departments always had some rules governing police officer behavior. But as 
the discussion of the limits of professional management in the previous section 
indicated, as late as the early 1960s existing rules generally ignored the critical 
issues of police use of authority and/or were couched in such general terms that 
they provided no meaningful guidance. 
Several general themes in the history of police rulemaking should be 
noted. First, rulemaking in policing emerged rather late compared with 
developments in the field of administrative law in general. Herman Goldstein 
was the first authority to propose rulemaking as a management response to the 
problem of police discretion.67  The first full discussion of the subject did not 
appear until 1975, with Kenneth C. Davis’s 1975 book Police Discretion.68  
This was almost thirty years after enactment of the federal Administrative 
Procedure Act, which established basic principles and process of rulemaking.69  
Second, rulemaking developed late because it was not a part of the tradition of 
O.W. Wilson-style of police management, and this constitutes one of the great 
failures of that reform tradition.  Third, rulemaking was, for all practical 
purposes, forced on the police by external forces. As already suggested, the 
Supreme Court initiated the process in its rulings on searches and seizures and 
in-custody interrogations. In the 1970s, as the Court began to withdraw from 
oversight of the police, rulemaking continued to develop in response to social 
protest and litigation in the areas of deadly force, domestic violence, and high 
speed pursuits.70 
The essential features of administrative rulemaking are well-known. In 
brief, it is designed to fill in the gap between law and practice. Statutes define 
the general responsibilities of public agencies but are not sufficiently detailed 
 
 67. Herman Goldstein, Administrative Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police 
Authority, 58 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 160 (1967) [hereinafter Administrative 
Problems]; Herman Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police 
Performance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1123 (1967).  Goldstein played a pivotal role in the development 
of rulemaking.  He was a field researcher for the American Bar Foundation Survey in the late 
1950s, which essentially discovered the problem of police discretion.  See WAYNE LAFAVE, 
ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 157-58 (Frank J. Remington ed., 
1965).  Goldstein and Frank Remington of the University of Wisconsin Law School were the 
principal authors of the first two chapters of THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE (1967), which initiated the 
discussion of police rulemaking. 
 68. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975).  Davis was a leading authority on 
administrative law, and author of the first treatise on the subject, KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1951). 
 69. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 65 (1969). 
 70. Id.; DAVIS, supra note 68; SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF 
DISCRETION IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950-1990, 33 (1993). 
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to cover all of the contingencies that arise. Through rulemaking, agencies 
promulgate their own internal rules to fill this gap and to provide guidance to 
front-line workers who make the critical decisions in implementing official 
policy. 
Police rulemaking has two core elements. Substantively, rules confine 
discretion by specifying what officers may and may not do in certain 
situations. Current deadly force policies, for example, limit shootings to 
situations where there is a threat to the life of the officer or some other 
person.71  Domestic violence policies typically specify that an arrest is either 
the required or preferred response to a situation where there is evidence that a 
felonious assault has occurred.72  Rules also structure discretion by specifying 
the factors that an officer should consider in the proper exercise of discretion. 
High speed pursuit policies, for example, instruct officers to consider road 
conditions and the potential risk to pedestrians or other vehicles before 
initiating a pursuit.73 
Procedurally, rules check discretion by requiring officers to file official 
reports on particular incidents. These reports are then automatically reviewed 
by supervisors. This report and review process forces officers, in a very literal 
sense,  “to account” for their actions. In the context of police history, the rules 
on deadly force, domestic violence, and pursuits are significant because 
officers had not previously been required to account for their actions or to face 
an automatic review of critical incidents.74  In discussing the “long march” 
toward the current defense of life standard for use of deadly force, Geller and 
Scott observe: “During the 1950s and 1960s, some police policy manuals still 
 
 71. WILLIAM A. GELLER & MICHAEL S. SCOTT, DEADLY FORCE: WHAT WE KNOW (1992) 
(presenting a history of police deadly force policies).  Arguably, the watershed event in police 
rulemaking was the promulgation of Policy #237 by New York City Police Commissioner Patrick 
V. Murphy in 1972.  The policy abolished the old fleeing felon rule and substituted the far more 
restrictive defense of life standard.  The policy also required NYPD officers to file a report after 
each firearms discharge and created a procedure for reviewing each and every report.  James J. 
Fyfe, Administrative Interventions on Police Shooting Discretion: An Empirical Examination, 7 J. 
CRIM. JUST. 309, 311-12 (1979).  Curiously, Murphy does not mention this, perhaps his most 
important and lasting accomplishment, in his autobiography.  PATRICK V. MURPHY & THOMAS 
PLATE, COMMISSIONER: A VIEW FROM THE TOP OF AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1977). 
 72. See generally DONALD BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE 85-86 
(1980) (providing research that indicates that officers based arrest decisions on non-legal factors 
such as the complainant’s preference or the social relationship between the complainant and the 
suspect). 
 73. GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & ROGER G. DUNHAM, POLICE PURSUIT DRIVING: CONTROLLING 
RESPONSES TO EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 7 (1990). 
 74. See PAUL JACOBS, PRELUDE TO RIOT 18-62 (1966) (discussing the lack of accountability 
in the Los Angeles Police Department in the mid-1960s). 
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made no mention whatsoever of the criteria governing when officers could 
properly use deadly force.”75 
There is evidence in at least some areas of policing that rulemaking does 
achieve its intended goals. The most persuasive evidence relates to police use 
of deadly force. The number of citizens shot and killed by the police dropped 
significantly between the late 1960s and late 1970s (but have remained stable 
since then).76  Perhaps even more important, the racial disparity between white 
and African-American citizens shot and killed has been cut in half between the 
1970s and 1990s.77  Research has also found that restrictive high-speed pursuit 
policies effectively reduce the number of pursuits, the number of accidents, 
and the number of both citizens and officers injured.78  At present, however, 
there is no clear evidence that domestic violence, arrest-preferred policies 
result in more arrests of spouse assailants. Nor is there any clear evidence that 
policies controlling the use of non-lethal force reduce such usage.79 
While a major step forward, administrative rulemaking in policing has 
serious limits. Its development has been haphazard and inconsistent. Many 
critical areas of police work remain ungoverned by rules (e.g., the use of 
informants, other undercover tactics, deployment of the canine unit, etc.). 
Many departments, meanwhile, have rules on the use of force that are not as 
comprehensive as they could be (e.g., limiting use of force reporting to 
incidents where there is injury). Finally, and most importantly, the existence of 
a written rule hardly guarantees that it is implemented as intended.  The 
implementation of rules and other elements of the new paradigm is discussed 
below. 
Administrative rulemaking is a central part of the consent decrees and 
memoranda of understanding secured by the Justice Department in its litigation 
under § 14141.  The specific applications are discussed later in this article. 
B. The Judicial Strategy: The Courts as an Instrument of Police Reform 
The void left by the professional management strategy gave rise to two 
major reform efforts seeking to impose external mechanisms of accountability. 
The most important of these involved using the courts as an instrument of 
police accountability. (The second, external citizen oversight is considered in 
the next section.)  The courts offer several different opportunities for pursuing 
 
 75. GELLER & SCOTT, supra note 71 at 251; see LAFAVE, supra note 67, at 209-10. 
 76. JODI M. BROWN & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, POLICING AND HOMICIDE, 1976-98: JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE BY POLICE, POLICE 
OFFICERS MURDERED BY FELONS 3 (March, 2001). 
 77. Id. 
 78. GEOFFREY P. ALPERT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, POLICE 
PURSUIT: POLICIES AND TRAINING 4 (May, 1997). 
 79. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 20. 
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police accountability: constitutional standards for police work, tort litigation, 
and criminal prosecution. 
1. The Constitution as a Code of Criminal Procedure 
One of the most significant events in American policing over the past half 
century was the intervention of the U.S. Supreme Court into matters of routine 
police work. The “due process revolution” in criminal justice was only one 
chapter of the momentous role of the Warren Court in imposing constitutional 
standards on many, if not most, areas of American life, and asserting itself as a 
major maker of social policy. In policing, the Court intervened into previously 
neglected areas of police procedure and fashioned a new set of rules based on 
constitutional law. Civil rights and civil liberties advocates hailed the Court’s 
activism and invested in it great hopes for police reform. Some experts argue 
that by establishing constitutional principles as a minimum standard for police 
work, the Court reshaped the debate over police reform and stimulated lasting 
reforms.80  The controversies surrounding the famous Mapp and Miranda 
decisions remain live issues into the present day.81 
Despite the enormous importance of the Supreme Court rulings on police 
procedure, even many police experts who fully support an activist Court role 
recognize the limits of the Court as an instrument of police reform.82  While 
the Court can enunciate grand principles of constitutional law, it lacks the 
institutional capacity to ensure compliance on a day-to-day basis. The Court 
rules only on those issues that are brought before it, and most police activities 
remain uncovered by any Court decision. If an illegal search does not result in 
prosecution and conviction, for example, there is no grounds for an appeal 
under Mapp. Compliance with Court decisions is uneven at best. Police 
officers have available numerous strategies for evading the intent of both Mapp 
and Miranda, to cite the two most important cases. There is a substantial 
literature on police compliance with (and evasion of) Court rulings.83  Finally, 
federal courts have no ability to ensure that all officers are even informed of 
important new decisions.84 
 
 80. WALKER, supra note 70, at 11. 
 81. THE MIRANDA DEBATE, supra note 14. 
 82. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 
349, 414-15 (1974); Livingston, supra note 19, at 819. 
 83. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical 
Study of the Effects of Miranda (1996), in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 
222, 230-231 (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III eds., 1998); See Richard H. Seeburger & 
R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Miranda in Pittsburgh—A statistical study, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME 
COURT DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL STUDIES 150, 152 (Theodore L. Becker & Malcolm M. Feeley 
eds., 2d. ed. 1973). 
 84. See STEPHEN L. WASBY, SMALL TOWN POLICE AND THE SUPREME COURT 217 (1976). 
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2. Tort Litigation 
Civil rights and civil liberties activists have also employed tort litigation, 
under federal or state law, as a strategy for enhancing police accountability. 
Apart from compensation for individual plaintiffs, the reform strategy assumes 
that if the dollar cost of police misconduct is raised to a critical level, local 
elected officials will respond by adopting the techniques of risk management 
and, thereby, impose meaningful police reforms.85  The strategy assumes that 
financial pressure might succeed where appeals to law and human rights fail. 
There is little evidence that the tort litigation strategy has succeeded. 
Academic studies of the strategy have generally found little direct impact on 
police reform.86  The flaw in the strategy appears to be the assumption that 
public officials will act in a rational and coordinated manner in response to 
rising litigation costs.  Instead, there appears to be a general pattern of 
disconnection and indifference rather than coordination and rationality in local 
governments. The general pattern appears to be that one unit (the police) 
engages in misconduct, another unit defends it in court, and another writes the 
check for damages. There is little evidence that mayors, city council members, 
or county officials have adopted the techniques of risk management to curb 
costs arising from police misconduct litigation, even when those costs are 
publicized in the local news media. Human Rights Watch, for example, quoted 
one police internal affairs officer as saying “civil cases are not our problem.”87  
A recent survey of police risk management programs found that even those 
programs that claim to have reduced litigation costs do not collect and publish 
data that would verify these claims.88 
The one documented case of a jurisdiction responding effectively to rising 
litigation costs is Los Angeles County, which created the Special Counsel to 
the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department (LASD) in 1993. Because the 
office of the Special Counsel is properly considered a form of citizen oversight 
it is discussed below.89 
 
 85. See CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, INNOVATIONS IN POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: AN 
EXPLORATORY STUDY OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND POLICE LEGAL ADVISING 9-10 (2002), at 
http://www.policeaccountability.org. 
 86. See Lant B. Davis et al., Project: Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 
812-14 (1979); Candace McCoy, Enforcement Workshop: Lawsuits Against Police—What Impact 
Do They Really Have?, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 49, 54 (1983); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED 
FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES at 85 (1998) 
(concluding that civil litigation “must always be available, but cannot be a substitute for police 
department mechanisms of accountability or prosecutorial action”). 
 87. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 86, at 81. 
 88. See Archbold, supra note 85, at 19; JAMES J. FYFE ET AL., POLICE ADMINISTRATION (5th 
ed. 1997). 
 89. See text at Part IV.C.2 infra. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
20 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:3 
 
3. Criminal Prosecution 
Community activists have also sought to curb police misconduct by 
encouraging criminal prosecution of officers guilty of criminal acts related to 
excessive force or unjustified shootings. The reform strategy is based on the 
expectation that successful conviction will both remove bad officers from the 
police department and deter future misconduct by other officers. 
Criminal prosecution has proven to be a notably weak instrument of 
reform.90  Convictions of police officers are extremely difficult to obtain. Local 
prosecutors, by the very nature of their role, have very close working 
relationships with local police. On the federal level, the resources of the U.S. 
Department of Justice are extremely limited, particularly in light of its general 
mandate and the existence of over 16,000 local law enforcement agencies in 
the United States.91  The legal standard, proof beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the officer had criminal intent, is very difficult to meet. Officers can always 
claim that they faced a threat to their own lives and were, therefore, justified in 
using force. Also, judges, grand juries and petit juries are extremely deferential 
to the claims of police officers that they were justified in taking the action they 
did under the circumstances that prevailed. Even when successful, criminal 
prosecution does not appear to deter future misconduct. Many officers have 
been prosecuted and convicted in both New York City and Philadelphia over 
the past three decades, and yet both departments are beset by continuing 
controversies. 
4. Summary 
The judicial strategy has had very mixed success in terms of enhancing 
police accountability. The Supreme Court has played a major role in 
establishing the principle that the police will be held accountable to standards 
of constitutional law and in stimulating a wide range of reforms. But even the 
most enthusiastic supporters of an activist Court role concede that the federal 
courts have, at best, a limited role as monitors of day-to-day police work. Both 
tort litigation and criminal prosecution, meanwhile, have very poor records in 
terms of achieving lasting improvements in policing. 
C. The Legislative Strategy: External Oversight of the Police 
 
 90. See ALEXIS AGATHOCLEOUS, PROSECUTING POLICE MISCONDUCT 9 (1998); Monrad G. 
Paulsen & Richard Bonnie, Securing Police Compliance with Constitutional Limitations, in THE 
RULE OF LAW, at 405-407, (James F. Short, Jr. & Marvin E. Wolfgang eds., 1970); HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 86, at 85-103. 
 91. MATTHEW J. HICKMAN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS 1999 (2001), www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ 
lpd99. 
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Community activists have also turned to the political arena in response to 
police misconduct, demanding external oversight of the police. In a familiar 
process known as “scandal and reform,”92 the exposure of police abuse 
(corruption, excessive force, etc.) provides an opportunity to mobilize public 
opinion and force elected officials to take some kind of corrective action.  
External oversight has taken two different forms: one-time, “blue ribbon” 
commissions and permanent, external oversight agencies to handle citizen 
complaints against police officers. 
1. “Blue Ribbon” Commissions 
“Blue ribbon” commissions are a familiar feature of the American political 
landscape. In response to a perceived social problem, chief executives at the 
local, state, and national levels regularly appoint a panel of experts to 
investigate the problem and prepare a report with a set of policy 
recommendations. There is a long history of  “riot commissions” appointed in 
response to episodes of urban racial violence.93  There is also a long history of 
blue ribbon commissions appointed in response to exposures of police 
corruption or incidents of excessive force. The Christopher Commission 
(1991), appointed in the wake of the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles, is 
the most well-known, recent example, although police history is replete with 
other examples.94 
National-level, blue ribbon commissions have made important 
contributions to American policing. The Wickersham Commission (1931),95 
the President’s Crime Commission (1967),96 and the American Bar 
Association Standards Relating to the Urban Police Function (1974)97 
documented existing problems, defined minimum standards, and helped to set 
reform agendas.  Commissions at both the national and local levels, however, 
suffer from one inherent weakness: they lack the capacity to implement their 
 
 92. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, SCANDAL AND REFORM xvi-xvii (1978) (adopting phrase 
“scandal and reform” to describe the process of exposing police abuse and the following 
community reform efforts). 
 93. See THE POLITICS OF RIOT COMMISSIONS 1917-1970 3, 4-9 (Anthony Platt ed., 1971). 
 94. INDEP. COMM’N ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (1991); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
supra note 86, at 44-46.  The Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department is 
also known as the Christopher Commission. 
 95. See NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 49, at 138-
39. 
 96. See THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 91-123 (1967); see also THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N 
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 245-46. 
 97. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE 
FUNCTION (1974). 
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own recommendations.98  By their very nature, commissions are temporary 
bodies that disband once the final report is released.  Reports typically lie on 
the shelf with their recommendations unimplemented.  (At best, these reports 
become useful sources for academic studies of the police.)  Implementation 
depends upon a voluntary effort by the police department itself. In some 
instances, the original scandal results in the appointment of a new police chief 
who makes a sincere effort to implement the recommended reforms. Before 
long, the political momentum for reform wanes, as the original crises fades 
into memory and public attention, particularly the attention of the news media 
moves on to new crises.99 
 
 98. See Samuel Walker, Setting the Standards: The Efforts and Impact of Blue-Ribbon 
Commissions on the Police, in GELLER, supra note 52, at 354-70. 
 99. Events in Los Angeles in the decade of the 1990s offer one notable example of this 
process.  The original 1991 beating of Rodney King led to formation of the Christopher 
Commission and the report that followed therefrom.  See INDEP. COMM’N ON THE LAPD, supra 
note 94.  These events prompted two follow-up reports assessing implementation of the 
recommendations.  A few years later the Rampart scandal erupted, prompting three separate 
reports and the Justice Department investigation that resulted in the current consent decree.  A 
notable exception to this general sequence, ironically in the Los Angeles area as well, is the series 
of events related to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, starting with the Kolts Commission, 
JAMES G. KOLTS, THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT (1992), and leading to 
the creation of the permanent office of the Special Counsel, see infra notes 115-18 and 
accompanying text. 
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2. Citizen Oversight 
a. The Citizen Oversight Movement100 
A second legislative strategy for curbing police misconduct involves 
creating a permanent external oversight agency to handle citizen complaints. In 
the police-community relations crisis of the 1960s, the creation of “civilian 
review boards” became one of the principal demands of civil rights groups.101  
The movement for civilian review appeared to suffer a fatal blow, however, 
with the demise of the independent Citizen Complaint Review Board (CCRB) 
in New York City in 1966 and the Philadelphia Police Advisory Board (PAB) 
in 1967.102  Then in the early 1970s, the movement quietly revived, gaining 
momentum in the 1980s, and emerging as an established part of American 
policing in the 1990s. Today, virtually all of the 50 largest cities are subject to 
some form of citizen oversight, as are an increasing number of smaller cities 
and county sheriffs’ departments.103 
The reform strategy underlying citizen oversight assumes that police 
departments are inherently unable to police themselves as a result of both 
bureaucratic self-interest and the power of the police subculture. Citizen 
oversight transfers responsibility for investigating citizen complaints to an 
independent agency staffed by persons who are neither police officers nor 
subject to the self-protective norms of the police subculture. 
The major contribution of citizen oversight agencies involves establishing 
the principle that the police should be answerable to the public through an 
independent agency. The creation of external agencies, moreover, appears to 
result in the filing of more complaints by citizens. The significance of this 
phenomenon is discussed below. 
b. The Limits of Citizen Oversight 
The relative success of the citizen oversight movement in establishing 
oversight agencies (albeit after a long and bitter struggle in virtually every city) 
has left many of its advocates with a bitter taste, however. Many external 
oversight agencies have been weak, ineffective, poorly led, and have not 
provided either satisfactory service to individual complainants or had any 
 
 100. This article uses the term citizen oversight because it is more inclusive of the variety of 
agencies that have developed in recent years.  See WALKER, supra note 21, at 5. 
 101. Id. at 25-26. 
 102. ALGERNON D. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE POLICE 71-93, 208-15 (1968) (explaining 
the brief history and quick demise of the New York City CCRB). 
 103. See WALKER, supra note 21 at 31-43 (discussing the revival and growth of citizen 
oversight). 
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scientifically measurable effect on police misconduct.104  The New York Civil 
Liberties Union, for decades the leading advocate of citizen oversight in New 
York City, has also been the leading critic of its child, the Civilian Complaint 
Review Board (CCRB), issuing a series of reports on its shortcomings.105  A 
recent report of a New Orleans Police-Civilian Review Task Force was highly 
critical of the Office of Municipal Investigations (OMI) that has been in place 
since 1981.106  An investigation of the Detroit police department found serious 
accountability problems, despite the existence of a civilian-staffed office of 
citizen complaints since 1973.107  Equally deep dissatisfaction has been 
expressed by community activists in other cities with long-established citizen 
oversight agencies, for example, in Portland, Oregon.108 
External oversight agencies fail for a variety of reasons unrelated to the 
underlying concept of citizen oversight. Some fail because they lack the 
authority to accomplish their stated objectives: e.g., an agency promising  
“independent” review of citizen complaints but not having power to conduct 
such investigations.109  Others fail because of a lack of resources: e.g., not 
having sufficient number of investigators relative to the size of the police 
department and the complaint caseload.110  Some have suffered from poor 
 
 104. See id. at 44-45 (discussing publicized events that occurred in cities that were either 
resistant to citizen oversight or where oversight clearly failed).  A good review of several citizen 
oversight agencies is found in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 86, at 123-383.  There has 
been little academic research evaluating the effectiveness of citizen oversight agencies.  WALKER, 
supra note 21 at 184-85.  Only a handful of evaluations approach the accepted standards of 
evaluation research.  E.g., Wayne A.  Kerstetter and Kenneth A. Rasinski, Opening a Window 
into Police Internal Affairs: Impact of Procedural Justice Reform on Third-Party Attitudes, 7  
SOC.  JUST. RES. 107, 107-125 (1994) (studying the community’s perception of the Internal 
Affairs Review Panel in Minneapolis). 
 105. N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FIVE YEARS OF CIVILIAN REVIEW (1998), 
http://www.nyclu.org/fiveyears.html. 
 106. POLICE-CIVILIAN REVIEW TASK FORCE, DRAFT REPORT OF THE POLICE-CIVILIAN 
REVIEW TASK FORCE 16 (2002), http://www.new-orleans.la.us/home/reports/ 
policeCivilianTaskForce.php. 
 107. Merrick Bobb & Julio A. Thompson, The Detroit Police Department (Jan. 1997) 
(unpublished report subsequently released by the Detroit Free Press).  The first chapter of the 
report, Introduction and Executive Summary, is available at http://www.freep.com/news/locway/ 
DPDReport1_29.htm. 
 108. See Portland Copwatch, 27 PEOPLE’S POLICE REPORT, August 2002, see also previous 
PEOPLE’S POLICE REPORTS. 
 109. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 61-63 (discussing the different models of oversight 
agencies and the meaning of “independence” in this context); Richard J. Terrill, Alternative 
Perceptions of Independence in Civilian Oversight, 17  J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 77, 79 (1990). 
 110. N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION FOUND., CIVILIAN REVIEW OF POLICING (1993) (providing 
comparative data on staffing levels of review agencies) (on file with author).  See in particular the 
low level of staffing for the Cincinnati Office of Municipal Investigations, with only one 
investigator for about 1,000 sworn officers. 
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management.111  Others fail because of a lack of political support, disinterest 
by police management, or staunch opposition from the local police union.112 
An increasing number of observers argue that, even with sufficient powers 
and resources, an oversight agency that focuses only on the investigation of 
complaints will have little long-term impact on the overall quality of police 
services in the field. First, the vast majority of citizen complaints are  
“swearing contests,” without independent evidence to support either side.113  
As a result, oversight agencies do not sustain a significantly higher rate of 
complaints than internal police complaint procedures.114  Second, even the 
strongest and most independent oversight agencies still have only the power to 
advise police executives but not to impose discipline themselves. Third, even if 
a significant number of complaints were to be sustained, there is no persuasive 
evidence that this would have a deterrent effect on other officers. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, focusing on individual complaints tends to make 
rank and file officers scapegoats for police misconduct when such misconduct 
is the product of an organizational culture that permits it to exist. Recognizing 
this latter point, a number of experts on oversight argue that oversight agencies 
should focus on policies and procedures designed to change the underlying 
organizational culture. 
c. The Auditor Model: An Alternative Vision and Role for Citizen 
Oversight 
A small number of citizen oversight agencies, however, show promise for 
making some significant, lasting contributions to police accountability.115  This 
promise is found in the auditor model of oversight, which reflects a different 
vision of the role of citizen oversight. The original idea of citizen oversight 
saw its role narrowly focused on the investigation of individual citizen 
 
 111. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 86, at 259 (“[W]hen a Human Rights investigator 
visited the OMI office on a weekday afternoon in late 1995, the office was absolutely silent, no 
phones were ringing, and some staffers were playing computer video games.”).  But c.f. 
MAYORAL TRANSITION TASK FORCE ON THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, TASK FORCE 
REPORT 7 (2002), http://www.nagintransition.com/task_force.html (The director of OMI “appears 
to have developed a very professional office staff, to have the highest respect for her position, and 
to recognize the importance of her office in terms of instilling public confidence in the City 
government.  There have been no complaints registered with OMI within the last two years about 
the quality or the manner in which OMI has conducted its investigations.”). 
 112. See POLICE ADVISORY COMM’N, PHILADELPHIA, FISCAL YEAR 1997 ANN. REP. 2-3 
(1997) (reporting litigation sponsored by the Fraternal Order of Police). 
 113. WALTER GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN: GOVERNMENTAL GRIEVANCE 
PROCEDURES 191 (1966) (presenting the first serious discussion of this issue); see also WALKER, 
supra note 21, at 121-37. 
 114. WALKER, supra note 21, at 137-38. 
 115. Id. at 34-40. 
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complaints.  The auditor model focuses on the police organization, seeking to 
change policies and procedures in ways that will prevent future misconduct. 
Policy Review. The most important auditing activity is the process known 
as policy review. Under policy review, the investigation of complaints remains 
the responsibility of the police department. The oversight agency reviews 
complaints for the purpose of both identifying problems with the complaint 
review process and also of identifying the underlying causes of complaints and 
recommending the appropriate corrective action. Underlying causes may 
include the lack of a departmental policy on particular kinds of situations, an 
outdated or inadequate policy, or a lack of training for either the officer in 
question or the department as a whole. Policy recommendations are not 
binding. The chief may accept or reject them. The San Diego County Sheriff, 
for example, has rejected a number of recommendations made by the Citizens 
Law Enforcement Review Board.116 
Several citizen oversight agencies maintain active policy review programs. 
The San Francisco Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC) made a total of 11 
policy recommendations in 1999 alone.117  The San Jose Independent Police 
Auditor (IPA) made a total of 49 recommendations between 1993 and 2000, 
only three of which were not adopted by the San Jose Police Department 
(action on two others was still pending at the end of 2000). The policy 
recommendations included such issues as the system for classifying citizen 
complaints, procedures for addressing potential bias in the internal affairs unit, 
a standardized investigation report, a process for notifying complainants about 
the status of investigations, and others. These policy recommendations might 
be seen as a form of organizational “house cleaning.” No single 
recommendation is likely to result in significant improvements in policing, but 
over time the sum total is likely to make the department more professional. In 
short, the San Jose Independent Police Auditor focuses on organizational 
change rather than the disposition of discrete complaints.118 
The new Office of Independent Review (OIR) in the Los Angeles Sheriff’s 
Department made seven policy recommendations in its first year of operation. 
These included the development of a written policy on surveillance of drug 
 
 116. Memorandum from Thomas A. Zoll, Assistant Sheriff (Acting), to Sue Quinn, Exec. 
Officer (Acting) of the Citizens Law Enforcement Review Board (Oct. 22, 1996), included in 
Citizens Law Enforcement Review Board, San Diego, Special Meeting Minutes app. (Feb. 3, 
1997) (on file with author). 
 117. OFFICE OF CITIZEN COMPLAINTS, SAN FRANCISCO, 1999 ANN. REP. (2000), 
http://www.sfgov.org/occ/areport99/anr99_toc.htm. 
 118. OFFICE OF THE INDEP. POLICE  AUDITOR, SAN JOSE, 2000 YEAR END REP. app. R at 83-
86 (2000), http://www.ci.san-jose.ca.us/ipa/reports/00/R%20-%20Recommendations.pdf; see also 
WALKER, supra note 21, at 94-98. 
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activities and guidelines to ensure high quality responses to civil claims against 
the department.119 
The OIR is the best example of the convergence of internal and external 
accountability mechanisms.  Established voluntarily by Sheriff Lee Baca, the 
OIR is staffed by six attorneys and directed by a former U.S. Attorney, all of 
whom are full-time employees of the LASD.  The office functions as an 
external auditor or monitor would, except that it is an internal accountability 
mechanism.120  The Integrity and Accountability Office (IAO) in the 
Philadelphia Police Department represents a similar approach: a non-sworn 
investigator who is a full-time paid member of the department.  An important 
difference, however, is that the IAO was created as part of a consent decree 
settling a suit alleging excessive force and race discrimination by the police 
department, and does not represent a voluntary action by the department.121 
To the extent that policy recommendations are adopted, they contribute to 
the administrative rulemaking process. Policy review adds to the rulemaking 
process by adding an outside perspective on police operations and also by 
basing policy recommendations on specific complaints, which grounds them in 
current operations. Even where recommendations are rejected, the policy 
review process serves a number of important functions.122  First and most 
important, it subjects the law enforcement agency to outside scrutiny and 
represents an orderly process for public debate over its policies. In this respect 
it creates the  “transparency” that many experts feel is essential for building 
and maintaining public trust. Second, the process has the long-term potential 
for transforming the culture of a police organization by establishing the 
principle that members of the department will be subject to regular outside 
scrutiny and will be expected to conduct themselves in a professional 
manner.123 
The policy review process also involves a new perspective on citizen 
complaints. Historically, police departments regarded them as a threat and 
responded with an equally hostile attitude. Police complaint procedures were 
decidedly not user friendly. In the policy review process, complaints are 
regarded as valuable “social indicators” and as a “management tool;” 
complaints are indicators of problems that police managers need to act on.124  
For the same reason, in the new paradigm complaints become important data 
 
 119. OFFICE OF INDEP. REVIEW, supra note 36, at 31-53. 
 120. Id. 
 121. GREEN-CEISLER, supra note 36. 
 122. CITIZENS’ LAW ENFORCEMENT REVIEW BOARD, SAN DIEGO COUNTY, 2000 ANN. REP. 
6 (2000), http://www.co.san-diego.ca.us/clerb/docs/00anl-rpt.pdf. 
 123. WALKER, supra note 21, at 149-57. 
 124. Drew Hyman, Citizen Complaints as Social Indicators: The Negative Feedback Model of 
Accountability, 6 OMBUDSMAN J. 47 (1987). 
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for the early intervention system (see below). And in this respect, the police 
review process represents a merger between a traditional external reform 
strategy (citizen oversight of the complaint process) and an internal reform 
strategy (professional police management). 
Arguably, the most successful auditor model of citizen oversight is the 
Special Counsel to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD).125  It is 
significant that the office of the Special Counsel was initially created as a 
means of reducing the department’s costs for civil litigation.126  In light of the 
previous discussion of the general failure of tort litigation as a reform strategy, 
the Special Counsel stands as an important exception to the rule. Subsequent 
reports of the Special Counsel have reported significant reductions in both the 
number of civil suits filed against the department and the amount paid to 
plaintiffs. As the semi-annual reports of the Special Counsel indicate, the 
Special Counsel has taken an extremely broad interpretation of his mandate 
and examined a wide range of departmental issues that could have some direct 
or indirect impact on civil litigation. These issues include recruitment and 
training practices, gender equity issues, gay and lesbian issues, as well as 
issues related to the use of force and civil litigation.127 
Perhaps the most notable example of the auditing process addressing 
organizational issues is the Special Counsel’s investigation into the high rate of 
shooting incidents among officers assigned to the Century Station. The 
investigation found that the shooting rate was associated with a series of 
management problems, including very young officers being supervised by very 
young sergeants, a sergeant to officer ratio that violated the department’s own 
guidelines, and a pervasive atmosphere that the station was an undesirable 
assignment that officers wanted to leave as soon as possible. In short, the 
problems in Century Station were not the result of a few “bad” officers but of 
basic management practices. It follows that the reform strategies directed at 
individual officers—tort litigation, criminal prosecution, citizen complaints—
are not likely to remedy these problems, while continued attention to 
organizational issues through an auditing process is likely to achieve the 
desired results.128 
 
 125. The Special Counsel’s web site is LOS ANGELES COUNTY, SPECIAL COUNSEL TO BOARD 
OF SUPERVISORS, at http://lacounty.info/bobb/htm; see WALKER, supra note 21 (discussing role 
of the Special Counsel). 
 126. LOS ANGELES COUNTY, supra note 125; KOLTS, supra note 99, at 352 (report prompted 
creation of the Special Counsel’s office). 
 127. LOS ANGELES COUNTY, supra note 125. 
 128. See generally MERRICK J. BOBB ET AL., THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T, 
9TH SEMIANNUAL REP. 7-34 (1998), http://lacounty.info/2ndShrfRpt.pdf; 15TH SEMIANNUAL, 
supra note 33, at 9-35. 
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Community Outreach. A second role for citizen oversight agencies 
involves community outreach.  This includes making information about the 
complaint process widely available throughout the community in the form of 
brochures, posters, and appropriate public service announcements. Particularly 
important is producing informational materials in languages other than 
English, as appropriate to the local community. The Minneapolis Civilian 
Review Authority (CRA), for example, issued brochures describing the 
complaint process in eight languages other than English. The most recent 
brochure is in Sudanese, a response to immigration patterns that have brought 
perhaps 20,000 Sudanese to the Minneapolis community.129  The Portland, 
Maine police department recently issued material about the department, 
including the complaint process, in ten languages.130 
An active community outreach program is designed to overcome the 
traditionally closed nature of citizen complaint procedures in police 
departments and is likely to generate a higher volume of complaints. As is 
explained below, citizen complaints are an important element in the new 
paradigm of police accountability, and their increased volume is not viewed 
negatively. Complaints are defined as a management tool, indicators of 
possible problems that supervisors should investigate. To be useful to 
management, complaints are entered into an early intervention (EI) system 
database that is used to track officer performance and identify potential 
problem officers. The central role of an EI in the new paradigm of 
accountability is discussed below. 
D. Summary: Reform Strategies in Perspective 
When viewed from the perspective of 100 years, past police reform efforts 
have accomplished much. In 1900, American police departments were utterly 
unprofessional, ineffective, inefficient, and corrupt. By the year 2000, police 
departments had generally defined a sense of professional mission, adopted at 
least the basics of modern management, raised personnel standards, and 
embraced innovations such as community policing and problem-oriented 
policing. Primarily through the intervention of the federal courts, 
constitutionally based, minimal standards of lawful behavior have permeated 
police work. 
 
 129. MINNEAPOLIS CIVILIAN POLICE REV. AUTHORITY, MINNEAPOLIS, IF YOU HAVE A 
COMPLAINT AGAINST THE MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT (n.d.) (a brochure on file with 
author). 
 130. Positive or Negative, in (Almost) Any Language, Portlanders Can Speak Their Minds 
About Cops, L. ENFORCEMENT NEWS, June 15/30, 2001, http://www.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/len/2001/ 
06.30 (last visited Sep. 20, 2002). 
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Despite these achievements, American policing still falls far short of the 
ideal of genuine accountability. Across the country, departments are embroiled 
in controversies over excessive use of force, race discrimination, and 
corruption. While an increasing number of departments have taken significant 
steps in the direction of establishing meaningful standards of accountability, 
the majority falls far short of the ideal. In this context we can summarize the 
shortcomings of the major reform strategies discussed above. 
The professional management strategy, until compelled to do so by 
external forces, failed to adopt policies and procedures that would shape the 
behavior of officers on the street in a positive direction. While the Supreme 
Court made a major contribution in terms of defining new standards of legality, 
it left most police work ungoverned by any decision, and more importantly, 
had little authority of its own to penetrate into the police organization and 
shape officer behavior. Neither civil litigation nor criminal prosecution have 
proven to be effective deterrents to police misconduct. Neither action 
succeeded in penetrating the police organization and changing the police 
subculture to the point of effective self-policing. Legislative strategies have 
also fallen short. One-time, blue-ribbon commissions have no power to 
implement their recommendations. Many citizen oversight agencies suffer 
from structural weaknesses, a lack of resources, or poor leadership. No 
research has demonstrated that oversight effectively reduces police 
misconduct. Some agencies, adopting a different model of oversight, do exhibit 
the promise of effecting long-term change. 
Even in the face of significant past failure, several promising reform 
strategies of the past provide the basis for the new paradigm of accountability. 
The most important strategy is administrative rulemaking, a technique that 
does reach deep into police departments and shapes officer behavior on the 
street. The policy review process conducted by some citizen oversight 
agencies, meanwhile, adds a new dimension to the rulemaking process. 
Furthermore, improvements in the complaint process through community 
outreach are likely to provide additional data for a departmental management.  
The new paradigm takes these changes and integrates them into a 
comprehensive accountability strategy. 
V.  THE NEW PARADIGM: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER 
The new paradigm of police accountability builds upon the more 
promising reform measures discussed in the previous sections and both extends 
and integrates them into a whole that is greater than the parts.  Several features 
characterize the new paradigm. First, it integrates otherwise discrete policies 
and procedures into a comprehensive accountability program. Thus, three 
elements of the new paradigm—use-of-force reports, citizen complaints, and 
traffic stop data—become the raw material for an early intervention system, 
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which is the linchpin of the new paradigm. Second, it relies on the systematic 
collection and analysis of data on police department performance for the 
purpose of identifying problems that can be addressed through official 
intervention. Third, the official intervention represents a proactive approach to 
reducing officer misconduct that is fundamentally different from the traditional 
reactive approach in which the department responds after an incident has 
occurred. The following section reviews the components of the new paradigm 
and examines their respective roles in the new paradigm. 
A. Early Intervention Systems 
1. The Concept of Early Intervention Systems 
Early intervention (EI) systems are the linchpin of the new paradigm of 
police accountability, and for that reason are discussed first.131  A relatively 
new development in police administration, EI systems are data-driven 
management information systems designed to help identify potential problem 
officers and then to provide those officers with some official intervention—
usually counseling or training—designed to improve their performance. The 
intervention is separate from the normal disciplinary system and is informal in 
the sense that no documentation appears in an officer’s personnel record. This 
informality gives supervisors greater flexibility in addressing performance 
issues that do not yet warrant formal disciplinary action, which would, in turn, 
trigger all of the formal requirements of a department’s disciplinary process 
and a collective bargaining agreement if one is in effect.132 
The concept of EI systems is based on evidence indicating that in any law 
enforcement agency a small number of officers are involved in a 
disproportionate percentage of problematic incidents, such as citizen 
complaints, use-of-force incidents, civil suits against the department, and other 
indicators of performance problems.133  Traditionally, these officers have been 
known to most other rank and file officers as well as many supervisors, but 
police departments took no action to correct their behavior.134 
 
 131. Livingston, supra note 19, at 846 (quoting “the concept of early warning is central to 
both [the Pittsburgh and Steubenville] consent decrees . . .”).  This author prefers the term “early 
intervention” (“EI”) to the more commonly used “early warning” because the latter term has a 
negative, punishment-oriented tone, focused on “problem” officers.  EI systems, however, are 
evolving in the direction of comprehensive personnel assessment systems for the purpose of 
assisting a wider range of officers.  See EARLY INTERVENTION, supra note 22. 
 132. Early Warning, supra note 22, at 1. 
 133. Sean P. Murphy, Wave of Abuse Claims Laid to a Few Officers, BOSTON GLOBE, 
October 4, 1992, at Metro/Region 1; Don Terry, Kansas City Police Go After Their Own “Bad 
Boys”,  N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1991, at A1. 
 134. HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY, 171 (1977). 
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An EI system consists of four basic components. The first involves the 
officer performance indicators that are entered into the data base: use-of-force 
reports, citizen complaints, involvement in civil suits, use of sick leave, 
resisting arrest charges, and so on. The second component involves the process 
by which the data are analyzed and certain officers selected for intervention.135  
The third component consists of the departmental intervention with those 
officers selected, usually in the form of counseling by supervisors, retraining, 
or referral to professional counseling. The fourth component consists of the 
follow-up monitoring to determine whether or not an officer’s performance has 
improved.136 
The one evaluation of EI systems to date, a study of three big city police 
departments that was published by the National Institute for Justice, found that 
the EI systems were effective in reducing citizen complaints and use-of-force 
incidents among officers subject to intervention. The evaluation also concluded 
that EI systems have potentially broader impact than just on individual 
officers. If implemented properly, they can redefine the role of first-line 
supervisors (principally sergeants) by providing them with both the direction 
and the tools (systematic data on officer performance) to intervene at an early 
stage with officers whose performance indicates problems in dealing 
effectively with citizens. At the departmental level, meanwhile, the evaluation 
suggests that an EI system database provides a comprehensive overview of 
agency performance and has the capacity to identify units with high levels of 
unacceptable performance.137 
There is preliminary evidence that an EI system has the potential for 
transforming the organizational culture of a police department and raising 
standards of accountability.138  This transformation is a product of several 
aspects of an EI system and its impact on supervisors. First, an EI system 
database gives sergeants systematic data on officers’ performance, thereby 
strengthening their hand when dealing with an officer who is having problems 
on the street. A sergeant can cite the data to rebut an officer’s claim that he or 
she is being singled out as a result of bias or personality factors. A survey of 
 
 135. The best description of this phase of an EI system is in 15TH SEMIANNUAL, supra note 
33, at 37-70.  The proper thresholds are a matter of much debate at present.  EARLY 
INTERVENTION, supra note 22. 
 136. EARLY INTERVENTION, supra note 22 (lists four components of an early warning 
system).  The earlier work, Early Warning, supra note 22, at 2, lists only three components of an 
early warning system. 
 137. See Early Warning, supra note 22, at 3-6. 
 138. The operative words here are “preliminary” and “potential.” The author makes no claim 
that there is independently verified evidence that the transformation has, in fact, occurred in any 
one police department. 
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police managers experienced with EI systems reported many positive 
comments regarding use of the EI system in this manner.139 
Second, and perhaps even more important, an EI system has the potential 
for enhancing the accountability of sergeants. EI systems have the technical 
capacity for documenting the extent to which a sergeant utilizes the system. 
The more sophisticated systems literally record the number of times sergeants 
log on to the system. Documented failure to access the system can be grounds 
for an unsatisfactory performance evaluation of the sergeant. Additionally, the 
EI database has the capacity to document comparative levels of problematic 
officer performance among sergeants, thereby identifying sergeants who may 
be failing to utilize the system effectively, or who may be conducting 
inadequate supervision 
Whether or not the potential of EI systems is realized is a crucial question. 
The NIJ evaluation of EI systems concluded that a system cannot be separated 
from the larger climate of accountability in a department. If there is no serious 
commitment to accountability on the part of the chief executive and the top 
command, even the best EI system is likely to be nullified by a hostile 
organizational culture. Conversely, where there is a commitment to 
accountability, an EI system is likely to reinforce other accountability 
mechanisms.140 
2. Early Intervention Systems and the New Paradigm 
An EI system is the linchpin of the new paradigm because it serves as the 
central repository of the data contained in the use-of-force reports, citizen 
complaints, and traffic stop data. And for precisely this reason it is essential 
that a department have a comprehensive use-of-force reporting system, an open 
and accessible complaint system, and a traffic stop data collection program. 
For an EI system to work effectively, it needs to capture as broad a range of 
officer performance indicators as possible. A “problem” officer, for example, 
may not necessarily have a large number of citizen complaints, and thus would 
not be identified by that indicator alone. But that same officer may well have a 
number of incidents in a number of different indicators (complaints, use of 
force incidents, resisting arrest charges, etc.), a pattern that suggests a general 
problem of dealing effectively with the public. 
EI systems are mandated by all of the consent decrees and memoranda of 
understanding between the United States and various local law enforcement 
agencies. They are referred to by different terms: an Early Warning System 
(EWS) in Pittsburgh;141 a Management Awareness Program (MAP) for the 
 
 139. See Early Warning, supra note 22. 
 140. Id. at 5-6. 
 141. Pittsburgh Decree, supra note 6, at para. 12. 
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New Jersey State Police;142 the Training Evaluation and Management System 
(or TEAMS II) in Los Angeles;143 the Personnel Performance Management 
System (PPMS) in Washington, D.C.;144 and the Risk Management System 
(RMS) in Cincinnati.145 The differences in terminology are irrelevant, as all 
embody the basic elements of the EI system concept. There are variations with 
regard to the performance indicators that are to be included in each EI system. 
The Pittsburgh decree mandates fourteen indicators; the Cincinnati decree, ten; 
and the Los Angeles decree, seventeen. These variations in the number of 
indicators are not crucial (as long as there is not just one or even just three 
indicators). There is at present no consensus among experts regarding exactly 
how many indicators should be used, and there are differences of opinion 
regarding other specifics of an ideal EI system. EI systems are a relatively new 
concept, and professional thinking about the best design is still developing.146 
B. Use-of-Force Reporting 
1. Use-of-Force Policies and Investigations 
Use-of-force reporting is one of the core elements of the new paradigm. 
The Justice Department report, Principles for Promoting Police Integrity 
recommends: “Agencies should develop use of force policies that address use 
of firearms and other weapons and particular use of force issues such as: firing 
at moving vehicles, verbal warnings, positional asphyxia, bar arm restraints, 
and the use of chemical agents.”147 The provisions of the various consent 
decrees address four separate issues related to police officer use of force: 
substantive use-of-force policy, incident reporting requirements, the 
investigation of force incidents, and entry of force reports into a departmental 
early intervention (EI) or risk management system. All police departments 
have some formal use-of-force policy, with a reporting requirement. The 
consent decrees and memoranda of understanding generally refine and extend 
those policies. Provisions related to the investigation of force incidents are an 
important innovation, and the requirements related to an early intervention 
system are the most important of all. 
With regard to substantive use-of-force policy, the consent decrees and 
memoranda of understanding vary, reflecting the specific problems of each 
department. The Pittsburgh decree requires a complete overhaul of the 
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department’s policy, directing the City to “develop and implement a use of 
force policy that is in compliance with applicable law and current professional 
standards.”148 The Memorandum of Understanding with the Washington, D.C. 
police contains a similar requirement.149 The Cincinnati Memorandum of 
Agreement, meanwhile, mandates clarifications of the existing use-of-force 
policy and has specific provisions severely limiting deployment of the canine 
unit, and the use of chokeholds and chemical spray.150 The latter provisions are 
significant because they bring under the ambit of “force” policy such actions as 
deployment of the canine unit. The Los Angeles decree, however, does not call 
for changes in the substantive use-of-force policy but does require a number of 
procedural changes regarding enforcement of the existing policy.151  All of the 
decrees require that officers report all enumerated force incidents. The 
significant aspect of the use-of-force reports is that they are required to be 
entered into an early intervention system. 
With respect to enforcement, the provisions of the Los Angeles consent 
decree are notable for their attention to operational details. First, use-of-force 
investigations are centralized in the Operations Headquarters Bureau (OHB), a 
change that separates investigators from the units where the officer under 
investigation is assigned.152  Second, the OHB is required to have the capacity 
to “roll out” (i.e., respond immediately to any incident) 24 hours a day.153 Use-
of-force incidents are to be immediately reported to OHB, the chief of police, 
the Police Commission, and the Inspector General.154 The department is 
mandated to negotiate with the police union to secure a requirement that in the 
case of shootings involving more than one officer, each officer be represented 
by a different attorney.155  All officers and witnesses are to be “separated 
immediately” after a shooting incident.156 Finally, investigators are required to 
evaluate the effect of the presence or non-presence of a supervisor at each use-
of-force incident and service of a search warrant.157 
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These decree provisions are designed to correct specific problems in use-
of-force investigations. Investigations have been compromised by too intimate 
a relationship between investigators and officers, a failure of the department to 
respond to force incidents in a timely fashion (which may result in the loss of 
witnesses or physical evidence), the failure to report incidents to the top 
command or other authorities, the collusion of officers for the purpose 
agreeing on a common and exculpatory version of the incident, and the lack of 
supervisory attention to critical incidents. 
The significance of these decree provisions is that, as an exercise in 
administrative rulemaking, they move beyond formal policy and attempt to 
ensure the integrity of the investigative process. Several informed 
commentators argue that the problem in the LAPD has been not the substantive 
use-of-force policy, but the failure of the department to enforce that policy.  
The LAPD’s own Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Incident lists thirty-
one formal policies and procedures designed to ensure integrity within the 
department.158 A separate report written by the noted legal scholar Erwin 
Chemerinsky concludes that the problem within the LAPD is “the culture of 
the Los Angeles Police Department, which gives rise to and tolerated what 
occurred in the Rampart Division and elsewhere.”159 
Failures to enforce existing use-of-force policies have been found in other 
police departments.160 The first monitor’s report in Philadelphia, for example, 
found that “rigidity of procedure and routine failure to follow leads or take 
obvious measures, and a tendency to view the case only from the officer’s 
perspective, result in too many inadequate investigations.”161 The 1992 Kolts 
report on the Los Angeles Sheriffs’ Department found “explicit and implicit 
biases against civilian complainants at every level of the complaint process.”162 
These problems included investigations being conducted by the supervisor of 
the officer under investigation, with resulting evidence of bias, investigations 
being “closed before completion—at times under highly suspicious 
circumstances,” and complaints that, although “corroborated by physical 
evidence and independent witnesses, are frequently not sustained.”163  The 
Cincinnati Memorandum of Understanding attempts to improve the integrity of 
investigations by requiring that officers notify their supervisors after any use of 
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force, that supervisors respond to the scene [presumably immediately]; that the 
Internal Investigations Section respond to the scene of “serious” force 
incidents and all canine bites that cause injury or require hospitalization, that 
investigators neither ask “leading questions,” nor give an “automatic 
preference for an officer’s statement over a non-officer’s statement, nor . . . 
disregard a witness’s statement merely because the witness has some 
connection to the complainant.”164 
The provisions of the Cincinnati Memorandum of Agreement related to the 
canine unit also address operational details. They require the department to 
revise its policy on the deployment of canines to limit “off-leash” 
deployments; to require officers to gain approval from an immediate 
supervisor prior to any deployment; to announce “loud and clear” to the 
suspect that a canine deployment is imminent; to prohibit bites by canines 
except “where the suspect poses a risk of imminent danger” (e.g., injury), and 
to call off the dog “at the first possible moment.”165 Additionally, written 
reports are required of all canine deployments and these reports are to be 
entered into the risk management system.166 
With respect to canine unit deployment, the Memorandum of Agreement 
with the Washington, D.C., police department requires similar reforms.167  On 
the contrary, the Los Angeles consent decree does not address substantive 
policy related to the canine unit but does require that all bite incidents (but not 
mobilizations) be entered into the EI system.168 
One particularly notable aspect of the Cincinnati Memorandum of 
Agreement is that all revisions to use of force policies proposed by the 
department are to be submitted to the Community Council “for their review, 
comment and education.”169 This requirement, which is not found in other 
decrees and memoranda, is designed to overcome the closed and insular 
organizational culture of the Cincinnati police department. 
2. Use of Force Policies and the New Paradigm 
The provisions of the consent decrees related to the use of force essentially 
adopted the established principle of administrative rulemaking, and in that 
respect do not represent any significant departure with respect to 
accountability. In two other respects, however, they represent something new 
and important. First, they extend the rulemaking principle into the area of force 
 
 164. CINCINNATI MEMORANDUM, supra note 2, at § V.B, paras. 26-29. 
 165. Id. at § IV.C, para. 20. 
 166. Id. 
 167. D.C. MEMORANDUM, supra note 9, at paras. 44-46. 
 168. L.A. Decree, supra note 8, at § II.A, para. 41(b). 
 169. CINCINNATI MEMORANDUM, supra note 2, at § IV.A, para. 13. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
38 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:3 
 
investigations. Previous reform efforts have generally focused their attention 
on substantive use-of-force policy, often merely requiring that a department 
have a policy, and completely neglecting the department’s enforcement 
process. The law enforcement accreditation standards, for example, require 
none of the enforcement procedures found in the Los Angeles and Cincinnati 
decrees.170 Livingston astutely comments that the Commission on 
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), the national 
accreditation agency, “has largely refrained from specifying the content of 
policies required in particular areas. . . .”171  Second and more important, force 
incident reports are entered into the early intervention system. The use-of-force 
reports are not a discrete aspect of police accountability but are integrated into 
a system that relates use of force to other areas of officer performance. The 
result is, at least potentially, a comprehensive approach to accountability, 
involving many different indicia (e.g., use of force, citizen complaints, traffic 
stops). 
C. Citizen Complaint Process 
1. An Open and Accessible Complaint Procedure 
The provisions of the consent decrees and memoranda of understanding 
related to citizen complaint procedures seek to enhance the openness and 
accessibility of those procedures.  This goal is consistent with the 
recommendation provided in the Justice Department report, Principles for 
Promoting Police Integrity, which suggests police departments “should 
provide a readily accessible process in which community and agency members 
can have confidence that complaints against agency actions and procedures 
will be given prompt and fair attention.”172 
As a first step, the decrees expand the ways in which citizens can file 
complaints. The Los Angeles decree, for example, requires that the department 
accept complaints “in writing or verbally, in person, by mail, by telephone (or 
TDD), facsimile transmission, or by electronic mail.”173 And in an even more 
significant change, the LAPD must also accept anonymous complaints.174 
Similar complaint filing procedures are required by the consent decree related 
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to the New Jersey State Police175 and the Memorandum of Agreement with the 
Washington, D.C., police.176 
To open up the complaint process, the New Jersey consent decree requires 
that officers carry both “fact sheets and complaint forms in their vehicles at all 
times while on duty.”177 Moreover, officers are required to inform citizens that 
they “have a right to make a complaint” if they are not happy with how they 
have been treated. Officers are also explicitly forbidden from discouraging 
citizens from making complaints.178 Finally, officers are required to “provide 
their name and identification number to any civilian who requests it.”179 With 
respect to community outreach, the decree requires: “The State Police shall 
develop and implement an effective program to inform civilians that they may 
make complaints or provide other feedback regarding the performance of any 
state trooper.”180 This includes the development of informational materials 
describing the complaint process in both English and Spanish.181 
Equally important are detailed provisions related to the investigation of 
citizen complaints. These provisions closely parallel those related to use-of-
force investigations and are designed to ensure that investigations are thorough 
and fair.182 The LAPD, for example, is required to record either by audio or 
video tape the interviews with all complainants, involved officers, and 
witnesses.183 This is a practice that has recently emerged in the field of citizen 
oversight and permits quality control checks of investigations by citizen 
oversight auditors, for example, who review tapes to identify incomplete or 
biased interviews.184  LAPD investigators are also directed to canvass the 
scene of a complaint incident to locate both physical evidence and potential 
witnesses.185 Also, attempts should be made to interview complainants and 
witnesses “at sites and times convenient for them.”186 
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Finally, the consent decrees and memoranda of understanding contain 
provisions related to the disposition of complaints. The Washington, D.C., 
Memorandum of Agreement requires that the “MPD shall continue to make 
findings based on a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard.”187 While some 
citizen oversight agencies have adopted formal standards for evaluating the 
evidence in complaints, many have not, and it is widely believed that most 
police departments have no formal standards. Additionally, the “MPD shall 
consider all relevant evidence including circumstantial, direct, and physical 
evidence, as appropriate, and make credibility determinations, if feasible.” And 
particularly important, “[t]here shall be no automatic preference for an 
officer’s statement over a person’s statement.”188 This is a particularly 
important rule since one of the major problems with police department 
complaint investigations has been the practice of discrediting citizen testimony 
and giving a preference to officers’ statements. 
The Collaborative Agreement in Cincinnati goes much further than any of 
the other agreements or decrees in restructuring citizen complaint agencies, 
requiring the city to consolidate the two existing citizen complaint procedures 
into a single Citizen Complaint Authority (CCA).189 At the time of the decree, 
Cincinnati had both a Citizens Police Review Board, with limited power to 
investigate complaints, and an Office of Municipal Investigation with formal 
authority to investigate complaints.190 The new CCA mandated by the consent 
decree will have a full-time executive director and five professional 
investigators. If nothing else, this consolidation ends the ambiguity 
surrounding conflicting jurisdiction over complaints. 
In an important step, the decree directs: “as a condition of employment, all 
police officers and city employees are required to provide truthful and accurate 
information to the CCA.”191 The issue of officer cooperation with citizen 
oversight agencies has been a major controversy. Through their unions, rank 
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and file officers have bitterly fought granting oversight agencies subpoena 
power. The lack of officer cooperation has been a major impediment to citizen 
oversight across the country since it denies the agency one of the most crucial 
sources of information.192  The provision of the Cincinnati Agreement 
requiring cooperation is a significant step toward improving citizen oversight. 
2. Citizen Complaints and the New Paradigm 
The changes in citizen complaint procedures mandated by the consent 
decrees and memoranda of understanding have three important effects with 
respect to the new paradigm of police accountability. First, for all practical 
purposes they initiate the development of a formal set of professional standards 
for citizen complaint procedures. At present, no such standards have been 
promulgated by law enforcement professional associations, the Commission on 
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA),193 or the two citizen 
oversight professional associations: the National Association for Civilian 
Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE)194 or the International Association 
for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (IACOLE).195 A number of citizen 
oversight agencies have developed their own detailed rules and procedures, as 
have many police departments, but these are locally-initiated efforts without 
reference to any national standards.196 As Livingston observed in an initial 
comment on § 14141 litigation, the law “may have the beneficial effect of 
further stimulating the articulations and dissemination of national standards 
governing core police managerial responsibilities.”197 
Second, changes that make a complaint procedure more accessible are 
likely to result in more complaints filed by citizens, either because there are 
more convenient ways to file complaints or because citizens are likely to have 
greater confidence in the process.198  An increase in complaints provides 
additional data for the departmental EI system, thereby enhancing its capacity 
to identify problem officers. 
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Third, the role of citizen complaints in the new paradigm represents a 
merger of internal and external mechanisms of accountability that historically 
have been seen as polar opposites. Civil rights activists have pursued the 
creation of external citizen oversight agencies in the belief that internal 
mechanisms are inherently incapable of effectively investigating complaints 
and disciplining guilty officers. In the new paradigm a reformed citizen 
complaint process that is more open and accessible provides data that, along 
with use-of-force reports and other performance data, are an important part of 
an EI system. It should be noted that the entry of citizen complaint data into an 
EI database occurs (or should occur) even where an independent, external 
citizen oversight agency has original jurisdiction over complaints; this is so 
because the records of complaint are such an important tool for management of 
the police department. 
D. Traffic Stop Data Collection 
1. The Racial Profiling Controversy 
Collection of data on traffic stops is another element of the new paradigm. 
Data collection is a response to allegations of racial profiling, defined as the 
police practice of stopping drivers on the basis of race or ethnicity rather than 
bona fide traffic law violations.199 The Justice Department report, Principles 
for Promoting Police Integrity, recommends: “[L]aw enforcement officers 
should report data to their agency on each traffic stop, including information 
on the race, ethnicity, and gender of the person(s) stopped.”200 The report 
observes that systematic data “can shift the debate surrounding racial profiling 
from anecdotal reports to a more informed discussion about the appropriate 
allocation of police resources.”201 For all practical purposes, traffic stop data 
collection is essentially a variation on the theme of use-of-force reporting. In 
both cases, the department requires officers to complete reports on citizen 
contacts that are potentially problematic. The new paradigm, in fact, can help 
to resolve the major problem now facing traffic stop data collection efforts. 
Traffic stop data collection has been the principal demand of civil rights 
groups as a remedy for racial profiling.202  Despite bitter opposition from the 
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police and their political allies,203 several states have enacted laws requiring 
some or all their agencies to collect data, and a large number of departments 
have undertaken voluntary data collection efforts.204 The San Diego, California 
police department is generally believed to have been the first to undertake a 
voluntary effort, and was soon followed by the San Jose, California police 
department.205 The first reports from these departments are currently available, 
as are reports from a number of other data collection efforts.206 
2. Problems with Analyzing Traffic Stop Data 
The assumption underlying the demand for traffic stop data collection is 
that the data will reveal whether or not an illegal pattern of discrimination 
based on race or ethnicity exists. This assumption has proven to be somewhat 
naive, and both criminologists and law enforcement professionals have found 
the interpretation of traffic stop data to be an extremely complicated 
undertaking.207 While virtually all of the official traffic stop data reports to date 
reveal racial and ethnic disparities in drivers stopped, they do not necessarily 
prove that the disparities represent discrimination. The controversy turns on 
the question of what should serve as the proper benchmark or denominator for 
the data on drivers stopped. In the initial lawsuits alleging racial profiling the 
plaintiffs presented observational data on the racial composition of all drivers 
and of observed traffic law violators on the highways in question.208 The 
official reports published to date, however, use official population data by race 
and ethnicity as the denominator. Thus, for example, the San Jose Police 
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Department found that Hispanics represented forty-three percent of all traffic 
stops but only thirty-one percent of the population of the city.209 
Many experts question whether population data are the proper denominator 
because they do not represent those drivers who are “at risk” for a traffic 
stop.210 There are believed to be significant variations by race and ethnicity in 
the driving age population and actual driving patterns (both in terms of average 
miles driven and also illegal driving behavior). Also, particular areas 
experience a significant number of non-resident drivers not represented in the 
census data.211 Observational data on actual drivers, such as was submitted in 
the early racial profiling lawsuits in New Jersey and Maryland,212 solves these 
problems, but such data collection efforts are extremely expensive and have 
not been used in official reports released to date.213 Consequently, these reports 
do not answer the question of whether a pattern of race discrimination exists. 
3. Traffic Stop Data and the New Paradigm 
The author of this article has argued that an early intervention system 
offers a practical solution to the problem of analyzing traffic stop data.214 
Officers complete reports on each traffic stop, and these reports are entered 
into the EI system database.  The denominator then becomes the traffic stop 
activity of officers working comparable assignments.  In theory, all patrol (or 
traffic unit) officers working a particular assignment should make roughly the 
same number of traffic stops. An analysis of the data can identify officers who 
stop a disproportionate number of African-American or Hispanic drivers. 
Further analysis can determine whether these officers’ activities warrant 
official intervention. At the same time, the analysis can identify officers who, 
contrary to departmental expectations, engage in no traffic stop enforcement, 
devote too much effort to traffic enforcement, or who stop a disproportionate 
number of female drivers.215 
Traffic stop data collection is a central component in the consent decree 
with the State of New Jersey for the obvious reason that racial profiling was 
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the principal basis of the Justice Department suit. The decree requires the 
collection of data on nineteen separate items, including, most importantly, the 
name and ID number of the officer, the gender and race of drivers and 
passengers, frisks and searches, and ultimate disposition of the stop.216 The 
Pittsburgh consent decree requires: 
The City shall develop, and require all officers to complete, a written report 
each time a PBP officer makes a traffic stop. The record shall include the 
officer’s name and badge number; the race and gender of the individual 
searched or stopped; approximate time and location; whether the stop involved 
a frisk or pat-down search; any weapons, evidence, or contraband found during 
the search; whether the individual involved was arrested or cited, and if so, the 
charges.217 
The Los Angeles decree requires the collection of ten items related to motor 
vehicle stops and nine items related to pedestrian stops.218 
It should be noted that the consent decrees and memoranda of 
understanding require the identification of officers making a traffic stop. This 
is an extremely important issue because rank and file officers have bitterly 
opposed officer identification and have generally succeeded in preventing that 
from being included in data collection statutes or voluntary department 
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or other property was seized; 15A. a description of the type and quantity of any contraband or 
other property seized; 16. whether the vehicle occupant(s) were arrested, and if so, the specific 
charges; 17. whether the vehicle occupant(s) were subjected to deadly, physical, mechanical or 
chemical force; 17A. a description of the circumstances that prompted the use of force; and a 
description of any injuries to state troopers and vehicle occupants as a result of the use of force; 
18. the trooper’s race and gender; 19. the trooper’s specific assignment at the time of the stop (on 
duty only) including squad.”). 
 217. Pittsburgh Decree, supra note 6. 
 218. L.A. Decree, supra note 8, at paras. 104-05. 
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collection efforts.219 As a result, many official data collection efforts are not 
capable of identifying individual officers whose enforcement activities are 
questionable. 
In each of the consent decrees and memoranda of understanding, the traffic 
stop data are required to be entered into the departmental early intervention 
database. In this respect, the effort to eliminate discrimination in traffic stops 
becomes integrated into a comprehensive accountability program along with 
efforts to both control the use of force and improve the citizen complaint 
process. 
E. Court Appointed Monitors 
All of the consent decrees and memoranda of understanding require the 
appointment of a monitor responsible for reporting to the court about 
compliance with the mandated reforms. While paid by the city in each case, 
monitors are agents of the court and, in that respect, independent of the city 
and police department to be monitored.220  Monitors represent an extremely 
important advance over previous reform strategies. As discussed above, the 
fatal weakness of blue ribbon commissions is their inability to implement or 
even oversee the implementation of their recommendations.221 The Supreme 
Court also has very limited power to enforce its decisions.222 The monitors 
appointed under § 14141 litigation are analogous to the special masters that 
have been appointed to oversee settlements in prison condition and mental 
hospital cases. The history of these institutional reform efforts, moreover, 
suggests that the implementation phase is usually a long and drawn out 
struggle, a history that suggests mandated reforms are not readily adopted.223 
The monitor in the Pittsburgh case, the first case settled under § 14141, 
developed an extremely valuable three-tiered framework for analyzing 
compliance with the consent decree. Primary compliance involves the 
development of a formal policy on a particular aspect of police operations. 
Secondary compliance involves evidence that the department has incorporated 
the policy into training and supervision. Operational compliance, the third 
level, involves evidence that officers comply with the policy in their routine 
 
 219. The author believes this is an extremely cynical and opportunistic position since officers 
routinely voluntarily identify themselves on arrest reports, incident reports, and other 
departmental reports. 
 220. L.A. Decree, supra note 8, at para. 161 (“The Monitor shall be an agent of the Court and 
shall be subject to the supervision and orders of this Court, consistent with this agreement.”). 
 221. POLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA, supra note 52, at 363. 
 222. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. 
 223. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998). 
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activities.224 This framework for analysis represents an important step forward 
because previous reform strategies have generally been limited to what is here 
defined as primary compliance.225 
The monitors’ reports published to date suggest the value of a mandatory 
monitoring process. First, the reports are lengthy and thorough, indicating that 
the individual monitors take their assignments very seriously.226 Second, at 
least one initial monitoring report, that for Washington, D.C., found that the 
police department had met none of the deadlines specified in the memorandum 
of understanding.  Although the problem appears to be a matter of pervasive 
organizational dysfunction rather than willful hostility, the report clearly 
indicates that the department is not likely to achieve the mandated reforms 
without sustained prodding by an external authority.227 
The consent decree-monitoring process is still in its early stages, so it is 
not possible to render a judgment on its success at this point. The newly 
formed Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC) is completing an 
evaluation of the process in Pittsburgh. PARC was established for the specific 
purpose of providing technical assistance to monitors, and has held a 
conference bringing together monitors, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and officials from 
monitored police departments.228 
VI.  AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW PARADIGM 
A. Achievements to Date 
 
 224. Auditor’s Eighteenth Quarterly Report, supra note 190, at 3 (“For the purposes of this 
audit, ‘compliance’ consists of three components: primary compliance, secondary compliance, 
and operational compliance.  Primary compliance is viewed as the administrative piece of 
compliance. It entails the creation of policy, procedure, rule, regulation, directive or command to 
‘comply’ as required by the text of the decree. Secondary compliance deals with training, 
supervision, audit and inspection, and discipline to ensure that a specific policy is being 
implemented as designed. To achieve operational compliance, both the primary—policy and 
directive—and secondary—training, supervision, audit and inspection, and discipline—must be 
achieved, and the directives must, by matter of evidence, be followed in day-to-day operations of 
the bureau.”). 
 225. ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, TURNING NECESSITY INTO 
VIRTUE: PITTSBURGH’S EXPERIENCE WITH A FEDERAL CONSENT DECREE (2002), 
http://www.vera.org/publications/publications_5.asp?publication_id=180, also available at 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Open=True&Item=563. 
 226. The New Jersey Monitor’s reports are available at www.nj.gov/lps/monitors.htm. 
 227. MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, SPECIAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR FOR THE 
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 73 (2002), www.policemonitor.org/ 
specialreportjune12.pdf. 
 228. Information on PARC, including the activities referred to here are available at 
http://www.parc.info. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
48 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:3 
 
The new paradigm of police accountability is cause for cautious optimism 
about the future of police reform. While previous reform efforts have achieved 
much, they have also left much undone. Controversies over excessive force, 
race discrimination, and corruption continue to embroil police departments 
across the country. The new paradigm represents a major advance over 
previous efforts by defining a specific set of best practices related to 
accountability that represent a comprehensive, integrated program of reform, 
with an overarching conceptual framework for accountability. The new 
paradigm also involves a sophisticated understanding of the requirements for 
lasting change in policing that builds upon the successes and failures of 
previous reform strategies. The new paradigm reaches deep into police 
organizations, shaping the on-the-street behavior of individual officers, and 
potentially changing the organizational culture of departments in a positive 
direction. With respect to use-of-force policies and practices, citizen complaint 
procedures, traffic stop data collection, and early intervention systems, the 
various consent decrees and memoranda of understanding go a long way 
toward defining national standards. 
Some of the monitoring reports of compliance with consent decrees and 
memoranda of understanding provide grounds for optimism, while others do 
not. The eighteenth report of the court-appointed monitor in Pittsburgh found 
the city to be in primary and secondary compliance in seventy out of seventy-
four tasks, but out of compliance in four tasks. Significantly, all of the out of 
compliance tasks involved the Office of Municipal Investigation (OMI), the 
independent citizen complaint agency, and not the Pittsburgh police 
department.229 The sixth report of the New Jersey monitor found that the State 
Police had made significant progress in many areas, although there were 
problems in some other areas.230 On the other hand, the monitor in 
Washington, D.C., found: “Despite substantial efforts in the past several 
months to compensate for an extraordinarily slow start, MPD has failed to 
accomplish virtually all of the milestones identified in the MOA within the 
time periods specified.”231 
The monitoring process itself is grounds for optimism since it creates an 
institutionalized mechanism for ensuring implementation of reforms mandated 
by consent decrees and memoranda of understanding. The idea of monitoring 
sets a new standard for future reform efforts that may result from some process 
other than federal litigation under § 14141.232 
 
 229. Auditor’s Eighteenth Quarterly Report, supra note 190, at 70. 
 230. Monitors’ Sixth Report, United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-5970 (D. N.J. July 19, 
2002), http://www.nj.gov/lps/monitors_report_6.pdf. 
 231. BROMWICH, supra note 227, at 1-2. 
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B. Grounds for Skepticism 
There are good reasons for caution and skepticism about the potential of 
the new paradigm, however. The history of policing is littered with promising 
reforms that never fulfilled their promise and quietly faded away.233 Rank and 
file police officers are well aware of this and are highly cynical about reforms 
they see as passing fads. 
1. From Policy to Practice 
The first and most important reason for skepticism is that all of the policies 
and procedures that comprise the new paradigm are essentially formal 
administrative arrangements.  To become operative they must achieve what the 
Pittsburgh monitor defines as the third level of compliance: verifiable impact 
on actual police operations.234  A use-of-force reporting system, for example, 
requires that officers complete the mandatory reports, that they complete them 
accurately, that supervisors give those reports meaningful review, and that 
officers be disciplined for any and all violations of departmental policy. The 
administration of such policies over time is one of the key components in 
shaping the organizational culture of a police department. Through experience, 
officers learn the organizational norms and the “going rate” for violations of 
policy.235 
In this regard, the Los Angeles Police Department represents a particularly 
important cautionary tale. The chapter of the LAPD’s Board of Inquiry Report 
on the Rampart Incident devoted to “Police Integrity Systems” describes thirty-
one formal policies and procedures designed to ensure integrity.236 Yet, the 
report conceded what critics of the LAPD have long argued: the department 
does not effectively investigate alleged misconduct nor discipline officers who 
are found guilty thereof. The independent report by the noted legal scholar 
Erwin Chemerinsky concurred, concluding that the LAPD had an 
organizational culture that condones misconduct.237 
Similar concerns surround early intervention (EI) systems. The NIJ study 
warned that they are enormously complex administrative procedures, requiring 
 
institutionalized center of expertise on police accountability that is useful to jurisdictions where 
there is no federal intervention.  See generally PARC, at http://www.parc.info. 
 233. One of the best examples of a faded reform effort is the team policing movement of the 
early 1970s, which vanished almost overnight.  See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., TEAM 
POLICING: SEVEN CASE STUDIES 107 (1973). 
 234. Auditor’s Eighteenth Quarterly Report, supra note 190, at 3. 
 235. The “compliance problem” with administrative rulemaking is discussed in WALKER, 
supra note 70. 
 236. See BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE RAMPART AREA CORRUPTION INCIDENT, supra note 
8, at ch. 10. 
 237. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 551. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
50 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:3 
 
close and continuing administrative attention. One EI system in that study 
ceased functioning for at least a year as a result of the transition following the 
appointment of a new police chief.238 A recent evaluation of the EI system in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico found that it lacked much of the administrative 
support necessary for it to function effectively.239 The court-appointed monitor 
in Washington, D.C., found that the system there was not functioning at an 
effective level.240 In July 2002 the New Jersey monitor expressed “grave 
concern” about the lack of progress with development of the mandated MMPS 
system.241 And most notoriously, the Los Angeles Police Department has not 
implemented its TEAMS II system,242 even though it had been recommended 
by the 1991 Christopher Commission report,243 and the LAPD has received a  
$170,000 federal grant for that purpose.244 
2. The Experience of Monitors To Date 
A second reason for skepticism surrounds the implementation of the 
consent decrees already in force. Although each decree includes the 
appointment of a monitor to oversee implementation, to date the evidence of 
the decrees’ effectiveness is mixed. The eighteenth, and most recent, report of 
the Pittsburgh monitor found that the Pittsburgh Police Bureau was generally 
in compliance with all mandated reforms, but the independent Office of 
Municipal Investigations (OMI), which has responsibility for handling citizen 
complaints, was not in compliance with respect to four mandated changes. The 
monitor overseeing the New Jersey State Police reported considerable progress 
by July 2002, although problems existed in certain areas of compliance.245 By 
comparison, the monitor in Washington, D.C. reported that the Metropolitan 
Police Department had missed virtually all of the deadlines established by the 
Memorandum of Understanding.246 Similarly, the initial stages of 
implementing the consent decrees in both Los Angeles and Cincinnati included 
significant opposition and foot dragging from either the departmental 
command or the police union. 
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In short, one should not assume that the existence of a legally enforceable 
consent decree ensures the effective implementation of the specific mandated 
reforms, much less a reduction in the use of excessive force or in racial 
discrimination. 
3. Costs 
A third reason for caution involves the cost of implementing the required 
dramatic short-term organizational changes. It has been estimated that 
implementation of the two Cincinnati agreements will cost $13 million “just in 
start up costs” for the provisions related to use of force.247 The City of Los 
Angeles has appropriated $29 million in fiscal year 2001-02 and $38.3 million 
in fiscal year 2002-03 for implementing the consent decree.248 Given the 
serious financial constraints affecting all state and local governments in 2002, 
there is serious cause for concern about the ability of some cities to bear the 
costs of agreed upon police reforms.249 
4. The Absence of Whistleblower Protection 
A fourth reason for skepticism is the paradigm’s failure to address the 
important issue of whistleblower protections. The Justice Department’s report, 
Principles for Promoting Police Integrity, recommends that police departments 
“should have in place appropriate protection against retaliation for officers 
who report misconduct.”250 A critical failure of the current reforms is that this 
issue is barely addressed by any of the consent decrees and memoranda of 
understanding. 
Effective whistle blower protection addresses two points that are part of 
the conventional wisdom among most police experts. First, it has long been 
recognized that one of the greatest impediments to achieving police 
accountability is the so-called code of silence, or “blue curtain,” under which 
officers do not report misconduct and refuse to testify against fellow 
officers.251 It is widely recognized that the police subculture actively reinforces 
the values of the code of silence. Second, it has long been recognized that 
police departments do not have adequate procedures for rewarding good 
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officers. This includes both officers who perform exceptionally well in the 
routine course of work and those who report misconduct.252 
Federal and state whistleblower protection laws currently exist. While a 
discussion of the effectiveness of these laws is beyond the scope of this article, 
a couple of points can be made with respect to their application in the police 
context. First, the burden of enforcing these laws falls heavily on the individual 
whistleblower, who generally faces organizational hostility, the enmity of 
fellow workers, substantial legal costs, a long and drawn out struggle, and a 
very uncertain outcome. Second, the police subculture poses particularly strong 
impediments to the effectiveness of such laws. Officers generally work in 
small groups (a partner, a precinct platoon, etc.)  that operate in “low-
visibility” circumstances out in the field. The folklore of policing holds that 
these work groups readily and easily punish fellow officers who do not 
conform to the occupational norms and especially those who publicly criticize 
the department.253 
The various consent decrees and memoranda of understanding are silent on 
the issue of whistleblower protection. This issue is also not addressed in such 
blue ribbon commission reports as the Christopher Commission and the 
Mollen Commission. The New York City Commission to Combat Corruption 
has addressed this issue, but has never devoted more than four pages to it in 
any single report.254 The independent report on the Los Angeles Police 
Department following the Rampart scandal recommended “a system where 
officers may report wrong-doing by other officers to the [LAPD] Inspector 
General, with an assurance of confidentiality, and with protection from 
reprisals.”255 Finally, there are no scholarly articles discussing how a 
whistleblower protection procedure would operate in the special environment 
of policing. 
The development of meaningful whistleblower protections should be a 
high priority on the agenda of police accountability reform efforts in the 
immediate future. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Litigation by the U.S. Justice Department represents a new paradigm of 
police accountability. This article has argued that this new paradigm represents 
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a specific set of policies and procedures that incorporate existing “best 
practices” related to accountability. Of equal importance to culling the best 
practices, these practices are integrated into a conceptual framework of police 
reform that moves beyond previous reform efforts. The most important aspect 
of this framework is the focus on organizational change rather than individual 
officers or discrete police problems (e.g., use of deadly force). Finally, the new 
paradigm represents a model of police reform that has the potential to achieve 
a life of its own, independent of future § 14141 litigation by the Justice 
Department. The list of “best practices” and the overarching conceptual 
framework, particularly the focus on organizational change, is an agenda that 
can be pursued by various means. 
The new paradigm discussed in this article represents a significant advance 
in the long effort to achieve higher standards of police accountability.  It is the 
occasion for some optimism about police reform.  The new paradigm builds 
upon past reform efforts, some of which made important contributions, but 
some of which failed to achieve their goals. 
While there is cause for optimism, it is premature to declare the new 
paradigm a success.  Serious police misconduct continues to plague many 
departments in this country.  The police, moreover, have a considerable record 
in frustrating reform efforts.  The new paradigm involves policies that reach 
deep down into police organizations and have the potential for reshaping the 
police officer subculture that has been able to frustrate so many past reforms. 
Whether the new paradigm will succeed in transforming that subculture and 
eliminating the major barriers to lasting reform remains to be seen. 
 
